Inefficacious response to terrorists attack in Nairobi County is regularly evident in accounts of inadequate preparedness of response organization. Infighting, incompetence and long duration taken for response in the face of attacks is recurring and costs for not having addressed their preparedness level are high, persistent instability of the city through threats deterring investment, loss of life of both Responders and citizens and destruction of property. Breaking this vested interest that undermines efforts to effective response, response organizations will require to address on issue of preparedness. The objective of this study was to interrogate on investigative intelligence aspect of preparedness of First Responders influence on efficacious response to terrorists attack in Nairobi County, Kenya.

The study was guided by resource dependency and systems theories. The study employed a descriptive survey design and the target population consisted of both state actors and non-state actors, First Responders to terrorists attack. Kenya Police (General Service Unit and Anti-Terror Police Unit), National Intelligence Service, hospitals, St John’s Ambulance and fire brigades were randomly sampled. While purposive sampling was used to select key informants and FGD. In the total, the sample respondents were 203. Primary data was collected through interviews, questionnaires while secondary data was collected from books, internet and newspapers. Validity was determined using content validity while reliability was done using test re-test method. Data was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistic and it was presented in form of tables and charts. Study findings indicated that intelligence is an important aspect in pre-empting terrorists attack leading to effective preparedness to terrorist attacks. The study further indicated that inappropriate analytical framework, inadequate structure to engage the community intelligence, poor cooperation with other First Responders agencies and limited interagency coordination were the main challenges contributing to intelligence failure. The study recommends that government needs to commit more resources toward investigative intelligence and also response organization should sensitize members of the public to cooperate with government in giving information that can help in intelligence gathering to facilitate preparedness of first responders.

**Keywords:** Efficacious response; Emergency preparedness; Terrorism.

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### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1. Introduction

Terrorism can be traced in the French revolution of (1789-1799) and defined as use of violence and threats to intimidate or compel by force in the quest for political change or fear to achieve a financial, religious or ideological aim (Cooper, 2011). According to Smith & Terence (2003), the issue of terrorism captured the global imagination in September 11 2001 as a result of dramatic and destructive attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon the core symbols of the world’s superpower, the United States of America. The attack shocked the superpower and its allies. Terrorists hijacked four passenger planes that were filled with fuel and used them as bombs to destroy the WTC in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. killing 3,000 people (Felter and Joseph, 2011). The act demonstrated the challenge of international terrorism changing global perspectives on both the threat of terrorism and the tools required to prevent it. Although multilateral instruments against terrorism have existed since 1960’s, the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorists network such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS and its affiliates constitute a new danger that challenges standing tools and institutions (Jaffin and Bob, 2008). Yet pursuing a regional approach involving all state holders in security matters is fraught with challenges. This calls for new and innovative preparedness strategies for effective response to terrorist attacks, and hence the need for a study.

According to Cooper (2011), the international counter-terrorism regime continues to suffer from weaknesses such as inadequate compliance and enforcement of existing instruments and limited resources and expertise. For instance, the November 2015 Paris attacks where a series of coordinated terrorist attacks occurred, France and the city’s northern suburb, Saint-Denis. Beginning at 21:16 pm, three suicide bombers struck outside the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, during a football match. This was followed by several mass shootings and a suicide bombing, at cafés and restaurants. Gunmen carried out another mass shooting and took hostages at an Eagles of Death Metal concert in the Bataclan theatre, leading to a stand-off with police. Attackers blew themselves up when police raided the theatre killing 130 people and injuring 100. The attacks were the deadliest on France and the European Union since the Madrid train bombings in 2004 (Faiola and Mekhennet, 2016). Shortly after the attacks, intelligence staff in multiple countries began to review electronic surveillance recorded before the attacks. It was confirmed that the French National Police met with German police and intelligence services a month before the attack to discuss suspicions that terrorists were staging out possible targets in France (Dickson, 2016).
In Africa, emerging security threats of nation states have become a source of challenge for most governments. Further complicating the security landscape is the increase in the outbreak of transnational terrorism that feeds into terrorism loop in Africa (Cilliers and Sturman, 1993). The growing threat of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria made Africa a region of growing terror concerns (Mona, 2015). On 14 October 2017, a massive blast caused by a truck bombing in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, killed at least 387 people and injured 316. The truck was detonated after it was stopped; the actual target of the attack is believed to have been a secure compound housing international agencies and troops. Though no organization claimed responsibility, officials stated that a key member of the cell that carried it out told them Al-Shabaab was responsible (Higgins and Stark, 2015).

In Nigeria, Boko Haram's worst terror attacks include: 2010: Killing of 75 people in suicide bombings and assassinations; freed nearly 700 inmates in a prison break. Aug. 26, 2011: Car bomb at U.N. headquarters in Abuja killed 23, injured 81. Sept. 17, 2013: Gunmen in military fatigue used illegal checkpoints to kill 142 civilians in Beni Shiek village. April 15, 2014: Abducted 276 schoolgirls in Chibok. Leader Abubakar Shekau threatened to sell them as brides or slaves. Jan. 3: Up to 2,000 people killed in towns of Baga and Doron-Baga (Bassey and Nnimmo, 2006). For instance, various responses has been adopted to combat transnational terrorism when military operations are deployed in Somalia and Nigeria, but still terrorism pervades Africa, thus need for new approach in understanding the preparedness capacity of First Responders on efficacious response to terror incidents (Nossiter, 2011).

Kenya has not been exempted in the terrorist attack trends since its deployment of troops to Somalia in pursuit of Al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-linked Somali militant group that has abducted foreign aid workers and tourists in Kenya. On October 14, 2011. Since its October intervention in Somalia, militaries have executed a number of terrorist attacks in Kenyan territory. Although authorities blame Al-Shabaab for much of the violence, it has also become clear that Kenya has a domestic radicalization problem of its own. Kenyan nationals have conducted a number of recent terrorist attacks in Kenya, with many of them receiving military training from Al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia (Mogire and Agade, 2011).

In late 2014, two attacks believed to have been carried out by Al-Shabaab killed 64 persons in Mandera County. On 22 November 2014, gunmen attacked a bus traveling from Mandera to Nairobi, killing 28 persons, mostly teachers and government workers heading to Nairobi for the December holidays. On 2 December 2014, Al-Shabaab militants attacked and killed a further 36 quarry workers, many of whom were non-Muslims, near Mandera town (Macharia and Miriri, 2013). Following Al-Shabaab's latest attack in Mandera County, experts and ordinary civilians stressed that a revamp of the entire security architecture and roles of First Responders was urgent to defeat terrorism.

In April 2015, gangs stormed the Garissa University College, killing 147 people and wounding several others. The attack is believed to be from the Al-Shabaab militant group, and indicated that they were retaliating over non-Muslims occupying Muslim territory. The militants took several students hostage, freeing Muslims but withholding Christians. Over 500 students were in distress in the siege that took fifteen hours (Mutambo and Hajir, 2015). Akin to Westgate attack, reports suggest that members of Kenya’s security apparatus were provided forewarning of an imminent Al-Shabaab attack. In addition to a number of foreign government agencies either issuing specific warnings or changes their travel advisories for the country, a number of Kenyan universities advised students and staff to be extra vigilant due to an unspecified threat. Such advisories were even issued in Garissa, where the Garissa Teachers Training College was closed amid concerns about security prior to the attack on the adjacent university campus. Yet despite these warnings, little was done to increase security provisions in a region (Zirulnick, 2015). Security forces were berated for their slow response, it took the country’s elite paramilitary unit seven hours to deploy to Garissa from their base in Nairobi. By the time they arrived, the majority of the deaths had already occurred (Odhiambo et al., 2015).

Nairobi County has not been exempted in terrorist attack trends. A bomb flattened the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on New Year’s Eve, killing 20 people and injuring 80 in the year 1980. An Arab group claimed responsibility, saying it was in retaliation for Kenya allowing Israeli troops to refuel in the capital en route to rescue 100 hostages being held by pro-

In August 7, 1998 suicide bombers in trucks laden with explosives parked outside United States embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi, and almost simultaneously detonated their bombs. In Nairobi, approximately 212 people were killed, and an estimated 4,000 wounded. The ‘bombers were planned by al Qaeda to mark the eighth anniversary of US forces’ arrival in Sandi Arabia, and brought the extremist group’s leader Osama bin Laden to the world's attention for the first time (Bennett and Brian, 2011). Later noticed that, in May 1998, a villa in Nairobi was purchased by one of the bombers by the name Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan to enable a bomb to be built in the garage (Shrivastav and Sanjeev, 2010). Mohammed Odeh (a terrorist) supervised construction of two very large, 2,000-pound (900 kg) destructive devices. The process of acquiring the room, making explosives and then planning for the attack without being noticed exposes our intelligence agencies underbelly on how they have failed the entire process of preparedness of First Responders to terror attacks in Nairobi County (Zirulnick, 2015). The rescue efforts were conducted by Israeli Rescue team due to their specialized equipment and saved a mother and a son trapped on the 22nd floor of the Co-operative House for more than 36 hours (Dunstan and Simon, 2011). The response level can measure the preparedness level between Kenya first responders and those from other countries, thus permitting need for the study.

On Saturday 21 September 2013, Al-Shabaab militants stormed Westgate shopping mall, an upscale mall in Nairobi, throwing grenades and firing indiscriminately at shoppers. The subsequent siege lasted 80 hours and resulted in at least 67 deaths and more than 175 people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting (McConnell and Tristan, 2015). Two weeks on, a detailed investigation based on interviews with survivors, their relatives, security forces and officers involved in the operation reveals how infighting, incompetence and a fatal friendly fire incident undermined the response and left the attackers free to prolong their slaughter (Sageman, 2004). Further political post-mortem, evidence surfaced of how both local and foreign intelligence had provided Kenyan officials with forewarning of a potential Al-Shabaab attack in the capital yet little was done to increase security provisions in the city (Garrison, 2011).

The way these terror attacks were responded to triggered many questions on whether the First Responders were prepared during terrorist attacks or not (Cooper, 2011). Yet, the role of adequate preparedness of First Responders, as well as its ability to facilitate effective response during terrorist attacks is not adequately tackled. Literature on terrorism response reveals a dismal focus on preparedness of First Responders on efficient response to terrorists attack. Although several measures have emerged to promote security and deter terrorism, there seems to be a discernable gap in how often agencies responsible for first response,
prepare its personnel during terrorist attacks (John, 2010). Of much weight is the fact that First Responders to emergencies vary a continuum in terms of organizational strength, their level of dysfunction can represent variable mixture of inadequate preparedness capacity for efficacious response to Terrorists attack thus terrorism a major security threats in Nairobi and the Kenya in general.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

In light of terrorists attack trends in Nairobi County, controversy has arisen over whether response organizations have overemphasized on preparedness for terrorists attack. A bomb flattened the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on New Year’s Eve 1980, killing 20 people and injuring 80. An Arab group claimed responsibility, saying it was in retaliation for Kenya allowing Israeli troops to refuel in the capital en route to rescue 100 hostages being held by pro-Palestinian hijackers at Entebbe Airport in Uganda (Aronson and Samuel, 2013). After the attack, Elite Security Consultants (ESC) Officer-in-Charge Worley Reed led the search and rescue efforts for two days along with the ESC staff, other remaining employees and the medical unit until professionals from Israel arrived to take over since it was unmanageable by Kenya first responders. Over the weekend, more U.S. government personnel and others, such as the Israelis, deployed to help. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrived to investigate and found out that there was no recordings during the occurrence of the terror act (Nossiter, 2011). On the morning of August 7, 1998 suicide bombers in trucks laden with explosives parked outside United States embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and almost simultaneously detonated their bombs. In Nairobi, approximately 212 people were killed, and an estimated 4,000 wounded. The bombings were planned by al Qaeda to mark the eighth anniversary of US forces’ arrival in Saudi Arabia, and brought the extremist group’s leader Osama bin Laden to the world’s attention for the first time (Bennett and Brian, 2011). It was later noticed that, in May 1998, a villa in Nairobi was purchased by one of the bombers by the name Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan to enable a bomb to be built in the garage (Shrivastav and Sanjeev, 2010). Rescue efforts were conducted by Israel Rescue team due to their specialized equipment and saved a mother and a son trapped on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} floor of the Co-operative House for more than 36 hours (Dunstan and Simon, 2011). On Saturday 21 September 2013, Al-Shabaab militants stormed Westgate shopping mall, an upscale mall in Nairobi, throwing grenades and firing indiscriminately at shoppers. The subsequent siege lasted 80 hours and resulted in at least 67 deaths and more than 175 people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting (McConnell and Tristan, 2015). A detailed investigation based on interviews with survivors, their relatives, security forces and officers involved in the operation revealed how infighting, incompetence and a fatal friendly fire incident undermined the response and left the attackers free to prolong their slaughter (Sageman, 2004). Judging from previous terrorist plots and attacks, terrorists will likely remain interested in conducting opportunistic attacks in Nairobi County against civilian targets and properties.

1.3. Objective of the study

The objective of the study was to interrogate investigative intelligence aspect of preparedness of First Responders influence on efficacious response to terrorists attack in Nairobi County, Kenya.

1.4. Research Question

The following research question guided the study:

How has investigative intelligence affected preparedness of First Responders efficacious response to terrorists attack in Nairobi County?

1.5. Justification of the study

1.5.1. Academic Justification

The study will inform the sub-discipline of emergency management studies and, therefore, provide a foundation for further research in the field of disaster management. The findings of the study will improve the academics in response organizations preparedness for effective response to terrorists attack and beyond by increasing reference materials in academic institutions.

1.5.2. Policy Justification

The study findings will help policymakers and the public better understand what past investments in preparedness have brought in relation to how response organizations responded to previous terrorists attack in Nairobi county. Moreover, the study will be useful to the Kenya government and other Counties in implementing effective and preventive approach response to terrorism and also in addressing gaps in security strategies and policy framework in relation to war against terrorism.

1.6. Scope of the study

Although there exist various literature on terrorism, this study focuses on preparedness of First Responders influence on efficacious response to terrorists attack in Nairobi County. The study time frame was from 1980, the year Nairobi County had the second major terror attack after 1975 Nairobi bombing (Torchia and Christopher, 2013). 1980, is when the Jewish owned Norfolk hotel was attacked by the Palestine Liberation Organization (Yossi, 2011). Moreover, the study aims at understanding the preparedness of First Responders influence on efficacious response to terrorists attack in Nairobi County, highlighting constraints that they experience for adequate preparedness during terrorists attack response. The study was conducted in Nairobi county, and ends in 2018.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Investigative Intelligence

Intelligence is a key factor in countering terrorism as it can provide the means to anticipate, pre-empt and respond to terror threats. Generating actionable intelligence for effective, efficient and timely responses is a cycle which involves several processes, including collection and analysis of raw information (Mehta, 2013). However, Hoffman (2006) says that the cycle is incomplete if intelligence is not properly shared. From this perspective, it can be argued that the failure of intelligence community
to respond to terrorist attacks can be attributed to failures in any of these three processes, collection, analysis or sharing Hoffman (2006).

The danger posed by the Al-Shabaab terrorists, their methods, their most likely targets and what must be done to counter their campaign of terror all this has long been established. What was needed all this time was a security strategy which could effectively check-mate Al-Shabaab, and yet, if we are to face the facts, we must admit that all this time the Al-Shabaab have been running rings round our security and intelligence establishment (Otiso, 2009).

It is important to recognize that terrorist attacks are not bolts from the blue. Criminals and terrorists follow a process when planning their actions. Kenya’s investigative community appears to have been lured into a terrorist lair. The terrorists seem to be winning as their attacks are discreditting our security agencies, particularly the intelligence and the police, in the eyes of citizens when they are made to appear unable to prevent and combat terrorism and other violent crimes (Mepham, 2002). This is evident when the four cell members, including two assailants, visited Westgate on September 9, 14 and 15 to conduct final reconnaissance. The Al-Shabaab chose Kakuma for the purposes of escaping surveillance and exploiting the security the camp offers after realizing that local cells, particularly the Majengo cell, had been under observation and most of its members had been killed while committing other crimes. According to Blair and Edmund (2013), the cell members entered Kenya through Uganda in late June 2013 and registered their SIM cards using fraudulently acquired identity cards. They then embarked on preparations including surveys of the targets before, shortly after midday on September 21, storming the mall and leaving a trail of death, with victims as old as 78 years and as young as eight, and the most vulnerable including pregnant women being killed in cold blood (Jason, 2013).

Terrorists have also scored another goal against our intelligence agencies by turning some communities against them. Whenever they hit, our agencies over-react with measures that alienate some communities. Terrorists in turn cash in on this alienation to recruit members and seek assistance from these communities for future attacks (Borelli, 2007). A third score is when the terrorists stretch the government and plunge the country into panic. Since targets are spread all over the country, it is impossible for the government to protect all public places and facilities, the repeated terror attacks in Kenya has revealed significant organizational challenges in the intelligence community.

Kenya’s experience of dealing with terrorism and crime over the past year demonstrates that there are strong cultural barriers that inhibit information-sharing across departments and agencies. While some agencies have enormous amounts of information, with dozens of databases, they restrict access even within the agencies. In part, this is because the administrative framework varies from one organization to another, which adds further impediments to effective information sharing and coordination for planning and preparedness during terror attacks. Information tends to be compartmentalized at organizational levels. For example, it is divided between different services and is intended for use in different procedures, thereby affecting the nature and sensitivity of the information that can be handled by the services (Deflem, 2006).

Terrorist groups have become more sophisticated using technology that enhances their communications and logistics networks (Sublette and Carey, 2014). On its part, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) seems unable to cope with the rapid pace with which terrorism is mutating, adapting and transforming itself thus hindering adequate preparation in relation to terror attacks (Sageman, 2004).

Recurring incidents of terror attacks accompanied by escalating levels of insecurity point to a sad reality that Kenya has security strategies but are not well implemented. Such a strategy should have at least four components: Identification of current and future threats to national interests; means and resources to address these threats; measures that may be taken to address the root causes of future threats; and capacities needed to enhance national security. Such a strategy should foster coordination across departments and agencies through alignment of resources, adaption of the education and training of national security professionals, and clarification of authorities (Cooper, 2011).

The response to the Westgate terror siege was an eye-opener that left a lot of egg on the face of our security community and First Responders (Murphy and Doyle, 2013). During West Gate mall attack, NIS was strongly criticized for failing to warn of the attack after it was revealed that two unnamed NIS officers had revealed that the NIS had passed warnings about an attack to the police, and that a pregnant woman had been warned by her brother, an NIS officer, not to visit the Westgate mall that Saturday because she would not be able to run with her bulging tummy. Kenya had prior intelligence of an attack in Nairobi, and that there were reports of NIS agents being at Westgate a few hours before the attack. From its start, the investigation was hampered by a wide range of conflicting eyewitness testimony about the number of attackers, the gunmen's true identities, and even their ultimate fates (Daniel and Douglass, 2013). It was then that the police, army, and intelligence services had been engaging in blame games after the attack (Afua, 2014).

2.2. Resource Dependence Theory

Resource dependence theory offers a second framework for understanding state security preparedness in local agencies. Theory emphasizes inter-organizational power relations and the need for resources, particularly monetary resources. Few organizations in society are self-sufficient; most require support from outside sources which can be; legislatures, customers, and granting agencies in order to survive (Pfeffer, 2000). The very fact that organizations rely on this external support means that they are, to varying degrees, dependent upon these resource providers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Resource dependence theory states that interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action. If resources are scarce, if resource flow is unpredictable, or if...
few other sources of resources exist, asymmetrical power relationships emerge where the resource provider becomes capable of making demands of the organization dependent upon those resources (Salancik, 2003). The result is an exchange relationship where an organization trades some degree of control of its operations and activities for critical resources. It is the fact of the organization’s dependence on the environment that makes the external constraint and control of organizational behavior both possible and almost inevitable (Sharif and Yeoh, 2014). The funding variable is more salient than crime-related measures derived from contingency theory. Some evidence supports a resource dependence view of state security preparedness as well. The federal government’s resource contributions to the state security efforts of local law enforcement agencies have increased immensely over the past decade. Moreover, many of the funding opportunities come with programmatic elements attached, agencies are eligible for receipt of funding if they comply with the typically broad goals outlined in the funding programs and/or have completed mandated training; the National Incident Management System or Incident Command System. Support for the resource dependence view is evident in a number of studies of terrorism preparedness like (Scott, 2003).

2.3. Systems Theory
A system is defined as a grouping of parts that operates together for a common purpose. The behavior of each element affects the behavior of the whole. There are six elements of a system consists of boundary, environment, observable interactions, sub: system, control mechanism and emergent properties (Baird, 2010). Terrorism occurrence can highlight the efficiency of the governmental system because the authority in charge, are facing the short time and the limited sources while they are being forced to continue to help the victims. Because terrorism reveal not only the structural strengths and limitations of the physical environment of a community but also how local, state and national response organizations function effectively and ineffectively. Therefore, the countries which have not structured comprehensive and strategic plan would be confronting more problems than other countries.

In spite of terrorism unpredictability, the governments can be prepared beforehand in order to cope with incidents. Recent terrorism had significant impacts on people’s health and the loss of people’s lives which could be controlled by appropriate management techniques. Intervention by the absence of comprehensive and fundamental planning will have unpredictable, unexpected and subsequently unaccepted consequences (Sublette and Carey, 2014). Services are found disrupted right at the time they are most needed, so strategic planning has to include some solutions in order to minimize these types of operation disruptions in times of crisis and disasters. Strategic planning provides the appropriate infrastructure for integrated, coordinated decision making following disasters such as terrorism. Hence, applying Strategic planning to disaster management can reduce the impact of terrorism on the community which results in reducing the number of casualties and disabilities. As emergency and crisis management imply, an effective emergency response and recovery operation in terrorism requires establishing vital collaborations and communications within the system and between the system and its environment. A major contribution of the strategic planning process to emergency and disaster management is the necessity of monitoring the nature and changing character of external forces and their impacts on the operations of an organization. Emergency planning is most likely to be successful when it is viewed, either explicitly or implicitly, from a systems perspective (Luhmann and Niklas, 2004).

The concept of the theories have been captured in the conceptual model.

![Figure-2.2. Conceptual Model showing interaction of variables](Image)

Source: Researchers (2019)

3. Methodology
3.1. Research Design
The study used descriptive survey research design in making a detailed examination since the study population was homogeneous in nature where by both qualitative and quantitative research techniques was applied. This design was bend in the study to obtain information concerning the current status of the phenomenon to describe what exists; with respect to specific variables or conditions in the situation. Kombo and Tromp (2006), describes descriptive research design as a systematic empirical inquiry into which the researchers does not have direct control of independent variables as their manifestation has already occurred or because they inherently cannot be manipulated.

3.2. Study Location
The study was carried out in Nairobi County which is the capital city of Kenya. The city is situated at 1°09’S 36°39’E and 1°27’S 37°06’E and occupies 696 square kilometres (270 sq mi). Is situated between the cities of Kampala and Mombasa, and adjacent to the Eastern edge of the Rift Valley. It has the population of 4,000,000 people (Nairobi City data, 2010).

Nairobi is divided into a series of constituencies with each being represented by members of Parliament in the National Assembly. These constituencies are: Makadara, Kamukunji, Starehe, Langata, Dagoretti, Westlands, Kasarani, and Embakasi. The main administrative divisions of Nairobi are Central, Dagoretti, Embakasi, Kasarani, Kibera, Makadara, Pumwani, and Westlands. Most of the upmarket suburbs are situated to the west and north-central of Nairobi, where most European settlers resided during the colonial times AKA ‘Ubabin’. These include Karen, Langata, Lavington, Gigiri, Muthaiga, Brookside, Spring Valley, Loresho, Kilimani, Kileleshwa, Hurlingham, Runda, Kitisuru, Nyari, Kyuna, Lower Kabete, Westlands, and Highridge, although Kangemi, Kawangware, and Dagoretti are lower income areas close to these affluent suburbs (Nairobi City data, 2010).
The city lies on the River Athi in the southern part of the country, and has an elevation of 1,795 metres (5,889 ft) above sea level. Under the Köppen climate classification, Nairobi has a subtropical highland climate, evenings may be cool, especially in the June/July season, when the temperature can drop to 9 °C (48 °F). The sunniest and warmest part of the year is from December to March, when temperatures average the mid-twenties during the day. There are two rainy seasons, but rainfall can be moderate. The cloudiest part of the year is just after the first rainy season, when, until September, conditions are usually overcast with drizzle. As Nairobi is situated close to the equator, the differences between the seasons are minimal. The seasons are referred to as the wet season and dry season. The timing of sunrise and sunset varies little throughout the year for the same reason.

Nairobi is home to the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), one of Africa's largest. The NSE was officially recognized as an overseas stock exchange by the London Stock Exchange in 1953. The exchange is Africa's 4th largest in terms of trading volumes, and 5th largest in terms of Market Capitalization as a percentage of GDP. The city is the regional headquarters of several international companies and organizations. In 2007, General Electric, Young & Rubicam, Google, Coca-Cola, IBM Services, Airtel, and Cisco Systems relocated their African headquarters to the city. The United Nations Office at Nairobi hosts UN Environment and UN-Habitat headquarters. Several of Africa's largest companies are headquartered in Nairobi. KenGen, which is the largest African stock outside South Africa, is based in the city. Kenya Airways, Africa's fourth largest airline, uses Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport as a Ranter (2017). Goods manufactured in Nairobi include clothing, textiles, building materials, processed foods, beverages, and cigarettes. Several foreign companies have factories based in and around the city. These include Goodyear, General Motors, Toyota Motors, and Coca-Cola. Nairobi has a large tourist industry, being both a tourist destination and a transport hub (Roger and Timothy, 1989).

### 3.3. Target Population

The total population of both state and non-state First Responders actors is 40,000 from which 203 were selected using purposive sampling to represent the entire population. The target population comprised both state and non-state actors’ first responders to terrorists attack. Kenya Police (General Service Unit and Anti-Terror Police Unit), National Intelligence Service, hospitals, St John’s Ambulance and fire brigades. The study purposely gave a special focus to Nairobi County as it is the capital city of Kenya, and has emerged as one of East Africa’s hot spots for terrorists attack mounted by radical Islamist groups; the bloody attack on West Gate mall in Nairobi is one example (Macharia and James, 2014).

### 3.4. Sampling Strategy

The study utilized purposive sampling to determine the settings and the participants. The researchers preferred this strategy so as to be in a better position to examine and explore a wide array of dimensions of study on assessing preparedness of First Responders during terrorist attacks in Nairobi County. Whereas quantitative studies strive for random sampling, qualitative studies often use purposive sampling, that is, a sample that has a characteristic relevant to the research question(s) (Galvin, 2015). In this study, purposive sampling was used to select the state and non-state institutions as well as respondents and key informants.

### 3.5. Sample Size

Sample size was drawn from various key informants selected from various institutions including: Kenya Police (General Service Unit and Anti-Terror Police Unit), National Intelligence Service, hospitals, St John’s Ambulance and fire brigades. The sample size for the study included; 22 Nairobi county fire brigade, 50 emergency medical technicians from both private and public hospitals and 76 Kenya Police (GSU and ATPU) from state actors. 22 from St. John’s Ambulance and 33 National Intelligence service was selected as non-state actors. The total sample size for the study was 203.

### 3.6. Data Collection Instruments

The main tools of data collection for the study was questionnaires since reduces bias since the researchers’ own opinions will not influence the respondents to answer questions in a certain manner. Moreover, by using questionnaires, a large sample of the given population can be contacted at relatively low cost since they are simpler to administer.
3.6.1. Primary Data
Primary data was collected using;

3.6.2. Questionnaire
Typically quantitative methods were characterized by the use of close ended questions for yes or no answers or set of predefined answers like Likert scale (example strongly agree or strongly disagree) which can be quantified, comparable and measurable to provide numeric results (Guest et al., 2006). In this study quantitative data was collected from First Responders from Nairobi County. A questionnaire was developed to collect individuals’ data. The quantitative data was collected from respondents and analyzed, then used to produce different statistical tables of varying kinds, and in simple statistical computations.

3.6.3. Observation
A qualitative research methodology covers a number of techniques such as interviews, participant observation. Qualitative methodology helps to understand life experiences and to reflect on the understandings and shared meaning of peoples’ everyday social life and realities (Marshall and Gretchen, 1999). Qualitative approach was used to collect primary data through interviews with the respondents within a period of the field work that is from the First Responders to terrorist attacks in Nairobi County. Personal observation was used where the researchers observed scenarios during terrorist attacks.

3.6.4. Focus Group Discussions
A face to face interview schedule was used to obtain information from individuals within the state and non-state actors. Specialized one-on-one interviews with some specific individuals from the identified institutions was used to get information that was presented in the study findings. In many aspects, these selective interviews shed light on controversial issues such as mode of operation and issues of intelligence in relation to First Responders preparedness for efficacious response to terrorists attack in Nairobi County. To some extent, the interview was used to explain some inconsistencies in quantitative data. In relation to variable chosen, it was of much important to use this technique because of sensitivity of information and fear of discussing the issue publicly by the interviewees.

3.6.5. Secondary Data
Website searches, research publications, newspapers and magazines, government reports, research publications and other relevant literature was reviewed. The obtained information guided in understanding of the variables.

4. Results and Discussion
Good intelligence is at the heart of such preparation, as well as political and social understanding of any grievances that might be solved (Deflem and Stephen, 2019).

4.1. Importance of Intelligence Aspects to Terrorists Attacks Preparedness in Nairobi County
The response on intelligence aspects to terrorists’ attacks preparedness was captured in the table as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>20</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime knowledge</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd mob psychology</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology know how</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data Analysis (2019)

Study findings indicated that respondents strongly agreed that intelligence gathering is an important factor in relation to preparedness to terrorist attack in Nairobi county. This was represented by high response rate of 120 respondents (71%). A closer number of respondents 40 (24%) agreed to this opinion while 10 (6%) were not sure if this aspect was important in relation to response to terrorist attacks. This findings concurs with Van and Michelle (2007), who observed that intelligence gathering is essential in countering terrorism, in diminishing its tactical effects and strategic importance. He stressed that “good intelligence is the best weapon against terrorism.”

On radicalization prevalence, 60 respondents (35%), strongly agreed that understanding the prevalence of radicalization of the young population is an important aspect which contributes to effective preparedness to terrorism. This is followed by 50 (29%) respondents who agreed over the importance this aspect in terrorist attacks preparedness, 46 (27%) were not sure on importance of understanding radicalization prevalence in terrorist attacks.14 (24%) respondents disagreed. Intelligence helps in identifying how terrorists become radicalized and its extent so that preventive measures can be employed to counter violent extremism.

Majority of the respondents 130 (76%) strongly agreed that locality of terror attack contributes so much to identify potentially sympathetic recruits with use of intelligence. They were complemented by 20 (12%) who agreed on the same aspect, 10 (6%) of the respondents were neutral, while 10 (6%) of the respondents disagreed. Respondents who agreed and strongly agreed had the highest number, 130 (76%) and 20 (12%). This results concurs with Gurung and Shaurya (2019), who asserted that terrorism is a complex phenomenon with high uncertainties in user strategy. The uncertain nature of terrorism is the main challenge in the design of a counter-terrorism policy. That locality of terror attack is useful in provision of patterns of attacks to analyze the terrorist activity patterns and relations, to understand behaviors and their future moves, and finally to prevent potential terrorist attacks. That with use of intelligence, the structure of the relations is analyzed to infer knowledge about terrorist attacks.

4.2. Effectiveness of First Responders to Terror Attack Preparedness
Respondents were asked to rank their level of preparedness to terror attack. Table 4.2 shows the relative ranking of the respondents
Findings from the study showed that intelligence gathering is effective in relation to response to terror attack preparedness. This was represented by a high response rate of 130 respondents (76%). A closer number of respondents (24) agreed that intelligence is very effective. (5) of the respondents represented by (3%) were neutral. 2% (3) indicated that intelligence was ineffective while 5% (8) indicated that intelligence gathering was very ineffective. Basing on findings, one can easily conclude that most of the respondents concurred that intelligence gathering is effective in terrorist attack preparedness. According to Jan (2015), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) intercepts both communication content and acquires call data records without warrants to gather intelligence and prevent crime, that police agencies acquire communications data with warrants to prepare criminal cases. That in Kenya, law enforcement agents are physically present within telecommunications operators’ facilities, formally, with the service providers’ knowledge to collect intelligence. The American embassy in Nairobi is the largest in the region that also acts as the communication headquarters for east and central Africa region. It’s possible that all intelligence to the US from the region passes through Nairobi as this is the communication command for east and central Africa. The strategic position of Kenya also attracts US interest as other competing countries like China who want to set base in Africa usually use Nairobi (Rhodri, 2013). Kenya is also a key ally of the US in the fight against terrorism and the fact that some of the most wanted terrorists have set foot in the country may also inform America’s close interest (Szoldra, 2002).

On dissemination of intelligence information, results showed that most of respondents admitted that dissemination of intelligence information was effective. This was represented by 52% (88). A closer number of respondents 18% (30) agreed that dissemination of intelligence was very effective. (10) of the respondents represented by (6%) were neutral. 12% (20) indicated that dissemination of intelligence was ineffective while 13% (22) indicated that dissemination of intelligence was very ineffective. Based on findings, the researchers concluded that dissemination of intelligence information was effective. These findings concur with Melanie and Mwangi (2019), who asserts that there is need to improve intelligence dissemination if they were to become more effective in the fight against terrorism. For instance, it has been reported that Kenya’s security agencies failed to heed warnings of an impending attack in the weeks before the Dusit D2 complex was hit. In the end, Kenyan security launched a reactionary response rather than intelligence-led preemptive action (Musambi and Everlyne, 2019). Security agencies also ignored the warning of a terrorist attack 19 days before the Westgate attack. A general warning was issued on impending terror attacks on malls. It was not acted on (Mwangi, 2012).

Majority of the respondents 110 (65%) indicated that First Responders to terror attacks had ineffective grasp of radicalization trends and patterns. They were supported by 7 (4%) who supported that grasping of radicalization trends and patterns was very ineffective to First responders to terror attacks. 40 (24%) of the respondents agreed that it was effective while 13 (8%) agreed that it was very effective. It is worth noting that majority of the respondents admitted that grasping of radicalization trends and patterns had not been achieved by First Responders to terror attacks for efficacious response. Was supported by 110 (65%). Basing on the findings, Mossakowski (2003), affirms that due to circularity of radicalization, it leads to complexity of violent extremism. It is not a linear process, but a circular one that can begin at any stage. Individuals recruited do not necessarily follow the trajectory of radicalization, followed by recruitment and taking up arms. In fact, there are individuals who join extremist groups before radicalization, and others who become radicalized after receiving training. Focusing on a single causality of radicalization overlooks the interventions that can be developed using a circular model (Vaisman, 2006).

### 4.3. Challenges contributing to investigative intelligence failure

Respondents were asked to rank challenges contributing to investigative failure. Figure 4.1 shows the relative ranking of the respondents.

![Figure 4.1: Challenges contributing to investigative intelligence failure](image)

**Figure 4.1. Challenges contributing to investigative intelligence failure**

Based on the analysis, 35 (21%) of the total respondents ranked inadequate technology as the biggest challenge contributing to investigative intelligence failure, followed by inappropriate analytical framework with 31 (18%). 28 (16%) ranked inadequate structure to engage the public/community intelligence as a third challenge. Poor cooperation within/with other First Responders/other agencies was ranked as the fourth challenge, represented by 24 (14%). 20 (12%) of the respondents agreed that limited interagency coordination was a challenge contributing to intelligence failure after the fourth challenge. Followed by slow decision with 16 (9%) respondents. Seventh identified challenge was ineffective command structure with 9 (5%) respondent, while 7 (4%) of the respondents agreed on competing interest as the least challenge contributing to intelligence failure.

### 4.4. Contribution of Interagency Collaboration/Cooperation in Identifying Individuals and Groups Engaged in Terrorism
Regarding the respondents’ position, 40 (24%) of the respondents confirmed that it was very important, 42 (25%) acknowledged that it was important. Majority of the respondents disagreed that it less important, represented by 75 (44%) of the population. 3 (2%) stated that it had no association while 10 (6%) of the respondents were not sure. The findings indicated that even though interagency collaboration/ cooperation has helped in identifying individuals and groups engaged in terrorism, the agencies have not achieved their targets in relation to counter terrorism, calling for more collaboration and cooperation in terms of intelligence sharing and training.

5. Conclusion
On the basis of the finding of this study, the following conclusion is made.

5.1. Effectiveness of Investigative Intelligence in Preparedness of First Responders and Its Influence on Efficacious Response to Terrorists Attack in Nairobi County
Inadequate technology, inappropriate analytical framework, inadequate structure to engage the public/ community intelligence, poor cooperation within /with other First Responders agencies and limited interagency coordination were the main challenges contributing to intelligence failure and a part from these challenges there is need for more collaboration and cooperation in terms of intelligence sharing to counter terrorism.

Recommendation
Challenges hindering investigative intelligence on the preparedness of First Responders during terrorist attack like; inappropriate analytical framework, inadequate structure to engage the public/ community intelligence, poor cooperation within /with other First Responders agencies and limited interagency coordination should be addressed for effective intelligence gathering. Government should commit more resources through financing in attainment of effective investigative intelligence. First Responders organizations should adopt and explore ways that can foster interagency collaboration and cooperation among themselves to assist in identification of individuals and groups engaged in terrorism. There is need for the intelligence and security organizations to sensitize members of the public to cooperate with the government in reporting suspected terror suspects.

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