

# Influence of Architectural Design of Arciss 2015 and R-Arciss 2018 Peace Agreements on Security Sector Reforms

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## Abstract

The world over, Peace Agreements remain the most frequently used means of ending conflict. For more than five decades, the Southern part of Sudan (now South Sudan) has been plagued by armed conflict, despite numerous conflict resolution efforts by both regional, international state and Non-State Actors. The study evaluates the influence of architectural design of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS 201) and the 2018 Revitalised-Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan, (R-ARCISS 2018) on Security Sector Reforms (SSRs). The study was anchored on John Paul Lederach's peace-building theory, social constructivism, Arnstein's ladder of Citizen participation and securitisation theory. The study primarily adopted a descriptive cross-sectional survey design, with correlational and explanatory research elements. Quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were used. Questionnaires, Content Analysis Guides, and focus Group discussions were also used. Target population was former and current members of armed groups in South Sudan. Snowball sampling was used to identify the respondents that were surveyed. Key informants were purposively sampled based on the individuals that could provide the most comprehensive information on the variables of interest to the study. For explanation and clarification, data from the study were presented using descriptive statistics such as tables, pie charts, bar graphs, and percentages, as well as inferential statistics. Findings indicated that the designs of both Peace Agreements are weak. As far as the process is concerned, weaknesses appear primarily where there were a limited number of mechanisms to address impediments to the agreement, little agreement on the ownership of natural resources, inadequate modalities of navigating the interests of external actors, and poor handling of differing political interests. It is recommended that a new process for a strong peace agreement be initiated, and that it should be preceded by rigorous baseline surveys so as to address some of the contentious root causes of the conflict such as negative ethnicity and militarisation along ethnic lines.

**Keywords:** architectural design of peace agreements; External and internal actors; Peace agreements: Security sector reforms.

## 1. Introduction

Security Sector Reforms (SSRs) are at the centre of post-conflict reconstruction, and they have been marked as an integral pillar of a reconstruction strategy, which demands a holistic approach to prevent the state from relapsing into armed conflict. With the help of the international community and partners, SSRs improve the capacity of a state to provide for its security, professionalize its security forces and institute legitimate state authority capable of promoting both intra-state and inter-state security stability. Whereas SSRs is not a new concept, it faces a lot of

challenges in its implementation (Dylan and Andrzej, 2002). These challenges stem from the lack of understanding of internal security dynamics to the cultural context of the state, political environment, and the general approach. For instance, in Central and Eastern Europe, the security sector experienced a lot of reorganization, restructuring, downsizing, and retraining following intra-state armed conflicts in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin wall. Such reforms were necessitated by the existence of large, unprofessional, and ethnic-based forces that were a threat to national, regional, and international security (Dylan and Andrzej, 2002).

According to the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (2011), in Kosovo following the end of the war in 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1244, which finalized the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo, and subsequently the demobilization of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This marked the creation of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), built from scratch with the support of the international community, and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which was established because of the demobilization of KLA, and played a significant role, especially in civil protection tasks. NATO drafted the peace agreement in Kosovo, which was mediated by Russia, the United States, and the European Union, as well as the United Nations. In the Philippines, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the government and the rebel forces of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 27 March 2014. In the agreement, a power-sharing formula was agreed upon at the same time the MILF was to be disarmed and abolished (Joseph, 2017).

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, the United States and its coalition partners faced challenges in implementing the SSRs. Since the entire military was dissolved and armed groups were required to be disbanded on the order of the coalition, the SSRs process was perceived as imposed and therefore lacked local support (Steffen, 2016). The security gap left through the disbandment of all security forces could not be filled by the coalition. In the process, most of the ex-combatants melted into the civilian society thereby creating a security challenge in Iraq.

In Sierra Leone following a peace agreement between the Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the end of the war in 2002, all armed elements including the government forces had to be screened as provided for in the peace agreement (Berdal, 1996). This subsequently led to the peaceful transformation of the security sector. The peace agreement was a culmination of a series of Accords; Abidjan accord of 1996, Conakry Accord of 1997, Lomé accord of 1999 and finally the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement of 2000. In this case, the United Nations, and Economic Community for the West Africa States (ECOWAS) member states played a pivotal role during the mediation process (Government of Sierra Leone, 1999).

One of Africa's longest civil wars ended in 2011 when South Sudan declared its independence from Sudan following the effective implementation of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) reached in 2005 (Einas, 2009). Late in 2013, just over two years after attaining independence, the South Sudanese were pushed into a horrific new conflict when a political issue that intersected with pre-existing ethnic and political fault lines started a war, bringing immense displacement and misery.

In August 2015, an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brokered peace agreement with the support of the Troika (USA, Norway, and the UK) and China was signed by South Sudan's warring parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia received widespread international community applause. According to Clayton (2020), the peace Agreement provided for the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), which stipulated immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities on both warring parties. However, the 2015 peace agreement failed to stop the fighting, and the situation worsened because of mistrust between the two warring parties which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians in Juba, the capital, and other states. Fighting in various parts of the country previously termed as stable spurred new displacement and amplified concerns about a return to full-scale war. During the violence, multiple recorded attacks by government forces on civilians and aid workers, including sexual assaults and ethnically motivated killings, did little to alleviate the situation (Human Rights Watch, 2015). The immediate international response was the deployment of additional U.N. peacekeepers to Juba to secure and stabilize the region. Juma and Odhiambo (2021), posit that the fervor for regionalism is etched in the minds of the political class globally. Some advocate for continental integration while others call for regional groupings that consist of few states whose defining criterion is territorial contiguity.

Despite modest progress toward the formation of a TGoNU, doubts about the parties' commitment to the pact were raised by repeated ceasefire violations, restrictions on the movements of peacekeepers and relief workers, and delays in the execution of important provisions of the agreement. Both sides continued to violate the peace agreement despite the organization and deployment of a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC) charged with monitoring its implementation. As part of its mandate to carry out the terms of the Agreement, the TGoNU was to be established no later than 90 days after its signature (IGAD, 2015). A peace symposium hosted by IGAD in Addis Ababa in June 2014 brought together members from the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS), the South Sudan Armed Opposition, ex-prisoners, and other political organizations. Most of the provisions of the agreement apart from the formation of the TGoNU, were either lagging or have not been implemented at all (Blackings, 2018). Most of the timelines in the agreement were unachievable due to their lofty goals. The simple awareness that one could defy the international community's will and get away with it spawned a slew of issues, including armed groups reorganizing and rearming, wilful resistance, abuse, and coercion of individuals or parties attempting or willing to enforce stipulated provisions. Because of the Sudan's Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA's) lack of professionalism and discipline, the army was unable to rise above the political squabbles as they erupted (Blackings, 2018).

The R-ARCSS was adopted on 12th September 2018 in Addis Ababa. Among its key stipulations was the creation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). The composition of R-TGoNU included Government of South Sudan (GoSS), Sudan's Peoples Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), South

Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), former detainees, and other minor political parties. As a result, R-ARCISS 2018 was seen as more inclusive than the previous *peace agreements*. R-ARCISS 2018 emphasized the importance of considering national diversity, gender, and regional representation (Horn Policy Brief, 2019).

Despite all these efforts, the solutions tailored to ensure successful implementation of SSRs in the post-conflict reconstruction process in South Sudan have been hampered by several challenges stemming from both national and institutional shortcomings. One of the major impediments to this is that the legitimacy of political authority has always been challenged. In addition to being a source of instability and a barrier to the development of an inclusive national identity, "the lack of a legitimate political authority makes it impossible to determine a strategic direction and make the difficult decisions necessary to achieve security sector change" (Detzner, 2017). As a result, no distinction exists between the Army (SPLA) and the ruling party, (SPLM) (Rolandsen, 2007). Because of these overlapping roles, every political difficulty is a security challenge, and every security challenge is a political one.

### **1.1. Statement of the Problem**

Conflict in South Sudan has continued to escalate despite IGAD's and international community efforts to cease hostility between the warring parties in the country through the formulation and implementation of successive peace agreements. It can thus be argued that failure to address the gaps in the previous agreements and loopholes in the architectural design of the agreements explains the reason of the relapse into violent conflict. For example, the failure and challenges that engulfed the implementation of the ARCISS 2015, hampered efforts meant to secure tangible conflict mitigating SSRs in South Sudan; consequently, prompting the formulation of the R-ARCISS 2018. The new agreement R-ARCISS 2018 was aimed at filling in the gaps associated with the former Agreement (ARCISS 2015). Regrettably, the new agreement does not seem to have had the desired impact in creating responsive SSRs.

Although numerous studies have examined the nexus between the architectural design of peace agreements on SSRs (Bhattacharya and Burns, 2019; Blackings, 2018; Huber and Karim, 2017; Tshibangu, 2020; Young, 2007), a systematic and comparative examination of the influence of the architectural design of ARCISS 2015 and R-ARCISS 2018 peace agreements on SSRs is yet to be undertaken. Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) being an important process that creates a conducive environment for SSRs especially in countries emerging from prolonged armed conflict, there is scanty literature on the status of South Sudan's peace agreement outputs enabling DDR. The fact that sporadic conflict has often occurred in South Sudan irrespective of the ratification of both agreements puts to question the contribution of peace agreement outputs on security arrangements on South Sudan's conflict-mitigating security sector reforms.

In view of the foregoing discourse, it is evident that understanding the contribution of the architectural design of peace agreements on conflict mitigating SSR in South Sudan since 2015 remains largely unexplored. This can be attested to by limited literature that directly delves into this study area. This ought not to be so in a country facing a conundrum of security challenges. As such, making empirically informed recommendations on how peace agreements in conflict-prone societies can be designed to achieve conflict-mitigating security sector reforms such as security forces reorganisation, citizen participation for receptivity of improved security, and security sector reforms marked by cultural, human, organisational and political change.

### **1.2. Objective of the Study**

Evaluate the influence of architectural design of ARCISS 2015 and R-ARCISS 2018 peace agreements on SSRs.

### **1.3. Research Question**

How does the architectural design of ARCISS 2015 and R-ARCISS 2018 peace agreements regarding actors, processes, and structures influence SSRs?

### **1.4. Justification of the Study**

#### **1.4.1. Academic Justification**

The study sought to supplement the limited literature that exists explaining how *peace agreements* impact the post conflicts security reforms. There is very limited literature concerning the architecture of *peace agreements* on the resolution of conflict in South Sudan and the effective implementation of SSRs in the country. This study would, therefore, offer the academicians an in-depth understanding of the relationship between *peace agreements* and post-conflict SSRs. This would provide a platform for the analysis of the relationship in countries that could still be facing such challenges following the end of prolonged armed conflicts. This would result in more research on the study.

#### **1.4.2. Philosophical Justification**

The philosophical grounding of this work came from three main theories, namely John Paul Lederach's Peace building Theory, the Securitisation Theory, and Arnstein's Citizen Participation Ladder. The three in conjunction lent themselves well to the discussion of the key constructs of the work which were the structural design of peace agreements, the outputs of the agreements (DDR) and the eventual security sector reform outcomes. It was pertinent to understand how the concepts of the architectural design of peace agreements interact with its outputs to inform the direction of security sector reforms and transformation. The discourse on the application of these theories and

models to the study concepts served to extend the boundaries of knowledge in the discipline of peace and conflict studies.

### 1.4.3. Policy Justification

Information generated from this study will be essential in guiding the formulation of responsive *peace agreements* in future. The study would produce empirically tailored policy recommendations rooted in the current socio-economic and political environment prevailing in the country which can offer an acceptable academic discourse that can inform policy direction, consequently, facilitating cessation of hostilities, protection of human rights and a return to the peace process. It would also be instrumental in informing regional bodies in Africa that have taken and will continue to take leadership roles in the mediation of conflict on how best to; approach a conflict situation, compose/constitute the mediation teams, undertake the process and the importance of the actors in the implementation to attain sustainable peace. It would further deepen the understanding of how poorly concluded *peace agreements* that do not address the root causes and interests of the parties to the conflict inform the recurrence of violence in post-conflict States.

## 2. Architectural Design of Peace Agreements

The African continent has witnessed continued and unending armed conflicts despite intervention from both regional and international actors. In trying to manage these conflicts, various methods and strategies have been employed in different countries. One of them has been mediation culminating to peace agreements. In Sudan, Angola, Somalia, and Mozambique conflicts were resolved through the signing of *peace agreements* between parties to the conflict. However, successful implementation of these agreements has been confronted by factors that include, differing political interests, disagreements on ownership of natural resources, external actors and interests, lack of proper infrastructure and security structures among others (Blackings, 2018).

South Sudan experienced civil wars in 1955 which ended in 1972 and the other one started in 1983. The end of the war in 1972 was a result of a peace agreement while the end of the 1983 war culminated in the signing of the CPA in 2005 leading to the secession of South Sudan and granting of independence in July 2011. However, bad governance and mismanagement and misappropriation, and unequal distribution of resources resulted in further division between communities along with ethnicity eventually resulted in another armed conflict in December 2013. The period between 1955 to date, therefore, has been marked by a series of armed conflicts followed by *peace agreements* that have been signed between various armed groups and either Government of Sudan or Sudan's Peoples Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A).

The study of *peace agreements* is not a new issue and has widely been researched. In Africa and beyond, bloody civil wars and violent conflicts have often been resolved through Peace Agreements to pacify the warring parties. The strength of the agreement rests largely on its design. The architectural design of a peace agreement comprises the people (actors) and the processes necessary to produce positive outputs that eventually translate into conflict-mitigating outcomes such as security sector reforms. According to MacGinty (2006), *peace agreements* refer to a brief memo that involves certain actors and regions a state. Comprehensive agreements involve a constitution that mandates a change in governing systems and inclusivity of all actors, oversight, and reform in the government institutions, reform of security sector, and transfer of territory. This agreement is signed by the parties to the conflict in good faith so that there is a smooth transition to peace.

### 2.1. Significance of Process in Peace Agreement Structural Designs

According to Vicenç (2015), for instance, strong Peace Agreements are those whose designs are based on previous agreements that have been proved to be successful (Vicenç, 2015). Badran (2014), argues that "a peace agreement is a sequence of acts rather than an isolated deal and that the design quality of *peace agreements* is determined by the number of mechanisms it contains to address impediments to cooperation. These mechanisms constitute the elements of its design". Badran categorizes impediments to cooperation as structural and procedural. Druckman and Albin (2011), posit that "durability is more likely to be achieved when the sources of conflict are addressed and resolved". The foregoing literature illuminates the importance of the agreement culminating from a sequence of actions rather than one isolated event.

Brereton and Ayuko (2016), carried out a study titled, "Negotiating Security: Sudan's CPA and Kenya's Political Accord." The focus of this study is the various peace agreements brought about by security negotiations in Sudan (2002-2005) and Kenya (2008) through carrying out literature reviews on peace agreements. The findings of this review show that these negotiations gave the durability of these agreements a priority as compared to the suitable conditions for their working in a bid to improve security on people in conflict areas. This study recommends using an alternative approach in analysing the quality of peace agreements so that they address human security. In the case of South Sudan agreements, this study puts into perspective how these they have helped in the improvement of human security and addressed the factors which have undermined their implementation while giving practitioners of international conflict resolution practical lessons.

The final text of the CPA was signed by the (SPLM/A) and the National Congress Party (NCP) of Sudan in January 2005, capping off a decade-long peace process that began in January 2002 with the signing of the Machakos Protocol. One of Africa's longest wars was finally over thanks to the CPA. Since 1996, IGAD has laboured to reduce conflict and instability in Sudan, and this is the result of their efforts (Vasu, 2016).

The independence on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011 was a result of the CPA, which was signed in Nairobi, Kenya, between the government of Khartoum and SPLM/A in the South. It comprised of the following protocols: "Machakos Protocol of

2002, (self-determination) and Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States and Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area.” The agreement allowed parties to form equal joint units comprising of members from both SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). It also provided timelines for “the disbandment/demobilization of South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) and the establishment of joint integrated units with equal numbers from the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces.”

A strong Peace Agreement should have a Ceasefire agreement and plan for the Demobilization of combatants. Since the aim of a peace agreement is to end hostility or armed conflict, the agreement must establish conditions for the desired peace. Therefore, in order to achieve this, all the parties and groups in the security organizations need to be neutralized (Ball, 2005) through a process established by the agreement. (Detzner, 2017) undertook a study titled, “Modern post-conflict security sector reform in Africa: patterns of success and failure.” This study examines the “where” and “how” recurring patterns of SSRs in African countries. It also looks at how the external environment affects the implementation of SSR programmes in post-conflict societies in Africa. The study shows that external influence especially inabilities by donors to finance ceasefire agreements accounts for the failure of SSR programmes in most African countries. An information gap is left, however, regarding whether or not this is the case for South Sudan.

Einas (2009), studied “The CPA and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan.” The study hypothesises that the available research on peace agreements indicate that agreements based on power-sharing are often harmful to the democracy of a nation as they only focus on the power of those involved without putting into consideration other political forces. The focus of this study is the 2005 CPA between the Sudan government represented by the NCP and the SPLM/A which has led to “political transformation on how the state is structured and power-sharing leading to a peaceful transition,” contrary to popular belief.

The IGAD peace process in South Sudan entailed determining the root causes of the conflict. The mediation process included leaders from Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. The IGAD region has been one of the world's most conflict-ridden and troubled areas since the end of WWII. The Ethiopia-Somali War, Somali Civil War, Eritrean War of Independence, Djiboutian Civil War, and Djiboutian-Eritrean border conflict, Eritrean-Ethiopian border War, Uganda-Tanzania War, Ugandan Civil War, Sudanese Civil War, and South Sudanese Civil War are only a few examples of inter- and intra-state wars (Kuol, 2015). IGAD has been at the forefront in seeking solutions to some of these conflicts, including coming up with *peace agreements*. IGAD's massive diplomatic efforts, combined with support from the African Union, resulted in a fruitful North- South Sudan dialogue, which culminated in the signing of the CPA in 2005, which lessened the tension between the conflicting parties and led to South Sudan's independence in 2011.

Again, as Woodward (1990) posits, the Sudan's Second Civil War ended when North and South Sudan signed the (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005), but the agreement failed because it granted hegemonic power and influence to the North, escalating the conflict between armed groups, which was fuelled by regional politics pitting the 'Equatorials' against the 'Nilotics' (particularly the Dinka), as well as regional discontent over the fate of the Anyanya guerrillas absorbed into the national army (Woodward, 1990). Oil income sharing was a fundamental component of the North-South Sudan peace settlement deal, which ended a decade-long civil conflict between the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan. Because the dividing line between north and south passes across developed and proposed oil resources, this was the case. One of the six individual accords of the 2005 CPA was based on resource-sharing agreements. This is because South Sudan's political arm SPLM, had stated that the party inhabiting the region possessed the land (both on the surface and subterranean resources), while the Sudanese legislature argued that the state's responsibility for subsurface land administration was essential for an unbiased and honest-to-goodness redistribution of characteristic properties. The mediators in the peace agreement were concerned about the confusion surrounding land and natural resource sharing, and they indicated that “ownership of subterranean natural resources would remain unresolved in the peace agreement” (Shankleman, 2011).

In 2004 an agreement was reached on wealth sharing famously known as the Agreement on Wealth sharing (AWS) which became a cornerstone of the CPA. The AWS gave the GoSS 50% of net revenue from oil sales (Shankleman, 2011) while the other 50% was given to the (GoNU). The AWS presented a cooperative approach through which two states agreed to share natural resources in an environment of anarchy while maintaining respective state sovereignty. As a result, the decision on who owns the natural resources in disputed regions was postponed until after the 2011 self-determination referendum (Ayoub, 2006). Consequently, this decision has made it difficult for Sudan (Khartoum) government to attract foreign investment to exploit the oil reserves (Achim, 2011).

Extant literature shows that armed conflict in South Sudan has been mediated by a myriad of internal and external actors both regionally and internationally. In this light, the interests of external actors often play a pivotal role in the implementation of SSRs. Without the willingness of all parties, it is hard to realize meaningful reforms in South Sudan (Jeong, 2000) since conflicting interests could lead to a resurgence of violence.

Peace agreements generate a lot of interest from regional and the international community, to an extent that some parties perceive the outcome of the talks would not address their interests but rather propagate an external agenda. The notion that a peace agreement must be in place as a prelude to a successful conflict resolution could have led mediators to focus their efforts on reaching an agreement without considering the existing cultural, social, and conflict dynamics. Walker (2004), postulates that “western conflict resolution methods prioritize reaching an agreement between individual parties over mending relationships that have been damaged by the conflict.” However, the level to which perception related to the perpetuation of foreign interests by peace agreements in South Sudan and how these impacts on SSRs have not been systematically studied.

## **2.2. Conceptual Framework**

Wasike and Odhiambo (2016), discuss the role of theories in guiding the thrust of academic studies. They emphasize the importance of theories in offering compelling and incisive causal explanations with calculated precision. They buttress their argument by quoting Smith (1986) who asserts that theories play the role of predicting, prescribing, and evaluating socio-political phenomena hence they cannot be ignored.

### **2.2.1. John Paul Lederach's Peace Building Theory**

The theory was proposed by John Paul Lederach in the late 1980s and early 1990s during the end of the cold war. John Paul Lederach argues that due to the complexity of contemporary conflicts there is a need for holistic approaches away from traditional diplomacy in order to prevent and end the escalation of these conflicts. He suggests holistic approaches that include peacebuilding and peacekeeping as long-term solutions to war that will lead to peace and stability. Since many conflicts are based on identity and relationships between the groups, there is a need to identify and determine the various shared meaning, explore different shared cultures, the experience of different actors, and their perceptions (Wilkin, 2016).

According to the theory, the main causes of identity conflicts are ignorance and failure of citizens' public participation, disrespect of human needs and rights in addition to unequal distribution of resources. Thus, conflicts are based on rights ownership and each party tries to win by fighting for their rights leading to a "For me to win, you must lose" attitude. This situation often leads to an outburst of disagreements, antagonism, hostility, and eventually a full-blown armed conflict. After achieving independence, South Sudan has been drawn into devastating new conflict deeply rooted in an inequitable distribution of resources, corruption, ethnic tensions, and the power struggle between Riek Machar and Salva Kiir among others which has sparked war, causing mass displacement and suffering. This necessitated the need for an immediate ceasefire and end cessation of hostilities on both warring parties, which culminated in the signing of various peace agreements.

In Lederach's theory, "external peacebuilders have only one mission: to support internal actors, coordinate external peace initiatives, engage in context-sensitive engagement, respect local culture, and take a long-term approach." He focuses on society's peacebuilding resources in his 'middle-out' approach. The approach divided the conflict society into three tracks of actors who include: Track I, the top leadership; Track II – the middle-level leadership; and Track III – the grassroots.

### **2.2.2. Arnstein's (1969) Citizen Participation Ladder**

Arnstein and Sherry (1969), created a model of a "ladder of citizen engagement" that defines eight categories that correlate to the eight rungs of a ladder. The ladder's rungs represent increasing intensities of participation. The lowest tier of partnerships is the manipulative type, in which citizens are "involved" by being appointed to rubberstamp advisory boards and committees for the sole aim of "educating" them and "engineering" their support. The lowest level represents the perversion of participation into a public relations vehicle by those in power, rather than genuine citizen participation. A situation is presented in which it is the government officials, not the public, who do the educating, the convincing, and the advising. Members of the community are often asked to put their names on documents endorsing policies on which they had no input.

As a further step, there is the therapeutic partnership. Group therapy is masked as citizen participation' in this type of partnership, with administrators (typically mental health professionals such as social workers or psychiatrists) assuming that helplessness is synonymous with mental illness and then imposing their own brand of clinical group therapy on the citizens. Many people are working hard, but their efforts are focused on helping people overcome their "pathology" rather than addressing the prejudice and trauma that gives rise to it (Arnstein and Sherry, 1969).

The next tier up, the Informing Type of Relationship, is characterized by a one-way flow of information from officials to citizens, with no outlet for feedback and no power for bargaining. Citizens are informed of their rights, obligations, and options in this partnership. This type typically shows itself at meetings where attendees are given only the most cursory information and are discouraged from asking pertinent questions. On the fourth level, the Consultative Type of Partnership, officials typically solicit community input but offer no assurances of action based on that feedback. Attitude surveys, neighbourhood gatherings, and public hearings are the most common approaches to gathering public input. Arnstein and Sherry (1969), argues that when powerholders limit citizen involvement to this level, participation is little more than a show. Participation is typically quantified in terms of how many people show up to meetings, how many people take flyers home, or how many people fill out a questionnaire, all of which reduce individuals into statistical abstractions. What citizens gain from all this is the experience of "participating in participation," while those in positions of power gain the appearance that they have involved "those people."

Arnstein and Sherry (1969), contends that the threshold at which citizens start to have some impact, although tokenism, is the Placation Type of Partnership. Placing a small number of "deserving" impoverished people on the boards of Community Action Agencies or other public organisations is an example of a placation tactic. While citizens are welcome to provide their opinions, they have no meaningful say in policymaking. It is the level of community organization, and the quality of technical aid citizens receive in identifying and articulating their goals that determines the amount to which they are appeased. At the next stage, Meaningful Partnership, citizens, and those in authority come together to negotiate a new balance of power. They've settled on joint policy boards, planning committees, and methods for resolving impasses as means of dividing and conquering the planning and decision-making workload. No one party can force a shift (Arnstein and Sherry, 1969). Next comes the Delegated Power Partnership, in which individuals negotiate with government officials to get preponderant say over a certain

initiative. At this juncture, citizens are in a position of power that allows them to ensure the program is accountable to them. I. Background (Arnstein and Sherry, 1969). The highest level of partnership is the Citizen Control Type, in which community members have equal say in all major decisions. It means that people who take part in a program can choose its overall direction, make all administrative and policy decisions, and negotiate the terms under which "outsiders" can make adjustments to it.

The model was found useful in informing the study regarding the variables to be measured so as to determine the level of community participation in the processes of both the Peace Agreement and establishment of the security sector reforms. More importantly, it also provided a means of assessing the type and level of community engagement by government and non-governmental organisations. The model helps to overcome the weaknesses of Lederach's model, because it goes beyond suggesting the importance of inclusivity to prescribing indicators that can be used to ensure meaningful participation.

### **2.2.3. Securitization Theory**

Political actors and elites might use the securitization hypothesis to justify taking any action they deem necessary to address an emerging risk after declaring it an existential threat (Wæver, 1995). State actors engage in securitization when they elevate previously mundane political issues to the status of "security," justifying the employment of extreme measures in the name of protecting the nation's citizens (Barry *et al.*, 1998). Problems that have been turned into security threats are not always those that are necessary for the objective survival of a state; rather, they are problems that someone has successfully constructed into an existential threat (Arcudi, G. (2006).

Theorists of securitization argue that the subjects that are most easily securitized receive a disproportionate share of resources and attention at the expense of those that are more difficult to securitize but result in more human suffering. Theorists frequently point to the fact that, despite the fact that traffic accidents and preventable diseases kill much more people each year than terrorism does, the former remains a top concern in debates of national security. The goal of the study of securitization is to determine "who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what effects, and least of all, under what conditions" (emphasis added). It is not the existence of an actual threat that determines whether or not a development is "securitized," but rather "the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a distinctive complexion," as Balzacq (2005) puts it. Technical, bureaucratic, public, and policymaking audiences all exist, and Roe demonstrates how each serves a unique purpose when it comes to securitization acceptance (2008).

Securitization has been criticized by liberal intellectuals like Daniel (1990) for having the potential to unintentionally release the emotive power of nationalism. Professors who support securitization for concerns like climate change, like Lieven (2020), acknowledge that doing so can lead to an overreaction by state actors, as seen in the War on Terror and, even more so, in the "war" on drugs and crime. Yet, the theory was validated since it allowed for introspection into the study's focus on the third pillar of security sector reforms. It helped with discussions of the parts of the peace agreements that were given too much or too little emphasis because to the securitization prism through which they were viewed.

### **2.2.4. Social Constructivism Theory**


Social constructivism contends that societies shape the identities, interests, and capacities of individuals (Barnett, 2006). The theory stresses that human action is linked to the subjective constitution of social reality and interests are constructed by the environment and interactions (Barnett, 2006; Williams, 2007). That acceptable action may inform how the state organizes its security structure and how to defend its interests. Constructivism acknowledges that culture matters to some degree, and it is generally accepted that both cultural factors and realist imperatives are inextricably linked with state and military behaviour.

Social constructivism and organisational culture inform the design of socio-political structures of societies and states. They also influence how that society will react to the changes in the security environment and the socio-political structures. Resistance to change can be informed by history, the experience of that society, how often has change been initiated over the years, and how this change is likely to affect the social structures related to power. Change can be categorised in terms of structure, interests, behaviour, and roles of various components within that society. If post-conflict reconstruction demands that the role of security forces be redefined and their structures reorganised and transformed following a change in the security environment within which they were operating, then such changes may destabilize the social and political order of that society. The socio-political environment that has been shaped by the 'hardened' culture of violence and militarization of the society to an extent that the military assumes the lead role in both the political and social arena may pose a challenge towards post-conflict SSRs.

South Sudan is an example of a society that has lived by the gun for over two decades that requires a total transformation to accept any change. The hardened culture may influence the fallacious belief that "if peace was gotten by the gun, it can be maintained by the gun"; and may remain committed to this organisational culture. With a change in the environment after the (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005), SPLA found itself in a situation where the central role it played for years is no longer a priority, as interests have changed, and it must strive to remain relevant. Their traditional self-regulating culture where it had autonomy on both political and military decisions based on its perception of threats to security needs to be redefined. The introduction of civil oversight bodies and other institutions in the management and control of the security sector may be viewed as an attempt to introduce new organisational culture bent to usurp the very power SPLA has fought for. Civil-military relations will continue to worsen if "the political, military and civil actors do not find an agreement and accommodate one another in the definition of the values and objectives of the security forces" (Williams, 2007). How prepared are the security

forces and institutions for this redefinition of their role and how will this affect their relationship with the civil populace?

### 2.3. Conceptual Framework Model



Source: Researcher, (2020)

Figure-1. Conceptual Framework for the Study

## 3. Research Methodology

### 3.1. Research Design

This study primarily adopted a descriptive cross-sectional survey design, with correlational and explanatory research elements. A descriptive cross-sectional survey design was utilized because ensured the expansiveness of data and exact distinct investigation of attributes of a specimen were utilized to make deductions about the populace.

### 3.2. Study Area

South Sudan is a landlocked country of the East-Central Africa region. The country gained independence from Sudan in July 2011. Its capital city is Juba. The country borders Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central Africa Republic, and Ethiopia. The study was conducted in South Sudan, in the regions of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, Warrap, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and Eastern Equatoria. These regions served as the cluster study sites.

South Sudan is traversed by the White Nile, which forms the vast swampy areas known as the Sudd. South Sudan has a population of about 12 million people, with most people being of the Nilotic peoples, (UNDESA, 2017). The main religion is Christianity. Due to persistent conflict, the country ranks the highest score on the American



Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (2018). The main ethnic groups are the Dinka (about 15% of the population) and Nuer (about 10%). The primary language of instruction in school is English. The main export from the country is oil. Like most other developing countries, the country is highly reliant on agriculture which includes crop and livestock production. On average, the temperatures are always high. The country experiences both rainfall and dry seasons but on average, the coolest month is January. The location for the collection of data was Juba, the capital city of South Sudan, and the seat of the TGoNU.

The country is rich in natural resources. It has fertile soils and rivers; with the River Nile traversing the country. The main rural economic activities in the country are small-scale peasantry and pastoralism. Oil is a major source of income for the government (98% of public sector revenue). However, over-dependence on oil means that the country is largely vulnerable to the shocks of global oil price fluctuations. However, years of conflict coupled with marginalisation have left South Sudan largely underdeveloped, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2016). The adverse effects of climate change have also led to negative socio-economic impacts on the local populations. The confluence of these factors means that most South Sudanese (51% of the total population) live below the poverty line Figure 2. Displays a map of the study area.




Figure-2. Map showing South Sudan Regions under Influence of Different Armed Groups  
Source: UNMISS, 2014

### 3.3 Study Population

The study's target population was (Former and current) members of armed groups in South Sudan which is estimated to be more than 300,000. The study population comprised key informants representing religious leaders, politicians, academicians, media houses, non-governmental organisations, IGAD mediators, JMEC members, and UNMISS staff. The study population also included ordinary community members and members of security agencies participating in separate focus Group discussions.

### 3.4. Sample Strategy and Sample Size Determination

The total population (N) of members of armed groups (whether actively or formerly) was approximately 300,000 which is more than 10,000. The sample size for the study (n), was calculated using the formula proposed by Fisher *et al.* (1998), which is quoted in Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) for use in social science surveys. It produces a desired sample size of 384:

$$n = z^2 pq / d^2$$

Where n is the desired sample size if the target population > 10,000

z is the standard normal deviate at the required confidence level i.e., 1.96

p is the proportion in the target population estimated to have the characteristic (Assume 50% if unknown)

q = 1-p (i.e., 0.5)

d is the level of statistical significance or Alpha

Therefore, the number of respondents sampled was 384.

The study employed a multistage sampling strategy to arrive the study subjects. In the first stage, the whole area was divided up into clusters, each representing the main zones where the groups are located. The zones, as indicated in Figure 3.1. were the Pro government zone; anti-government zone; Contested Zone; Government-aligned zone; declared 'peace zone' between SPLA and SSDM/Cobra; Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) concentration

zone and SPLA in Opposition concentration Zone. The distribution of these groups roughly coincided with the administrative areas of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, Warrap, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and Eastern Equatoria. These areas formed the 10 clusters of the study.

The second stage was non proportionate quota sampling in which the sample size of 384 was apportioned equally among the 10 cluster sites. Hence, from each cluster, 40 respondents were sampled, however, only first 384 who completed questionnaires were analysed. Snowballing was used at the last stage to identify the actual respondents that were surveyed. In each cluster, after the first member was identified with the aid of the administration, he/she helped in identifying others to be included. This happened until the quota of 40 was filled, and then the research team moved to the next cluster to repeat the exercise till the required number was attained. Key informants were purposively sampled based on the individuals that could provide the most comprehensive information on the variables of interest to the study.

### 3.5. Data Collection

The data collected was from both primary and secondary sources, and both quantitative and qualitative tools were used. The primary data tools included a pre coded structured individual questionnaire, Key Informant Interview Guides, Focus Group Discussion Guides, Document Content Analysis Guide, and a Digital Camera.

### 3.6. Data Analysis and Presentation

Questionnaires were cleaned and verified while still in the field. After the data was collected, it was edited, coded, classified, tabulated, and analysed. To make data collection easier, all statements were given numeric codes based on their context. The quantitative data was analysed in tables and charts using SPSS version 20 and the Microsoft Excel Statistical Packages. For explanation and clarification, data from the study were presented using descriptive statistics such as tables, pie charts, bar graphs, and percentages, as well as inferential statistics (Pearson correlation and, regression analysis). Data from Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions were analysed and presented according to the themes of the study and presented alongside the quantitative data in a synchronised manner. Direct quotations were used to present verbal reports that occurred during the research process. Document Content analysis was similarly done according to the themes corresponding with the objectives of the study and presented alongside the other data.

## 4. Findings

### 4.1. Participation of Actors in the Formulation of the Agreement

Literature records that the history of peace mediations in southern part of Sudan, now South Sudan has mainly been shaped by and depended on military leaders of the Dinka and the Nuer (Madut and Hutchinson, 1999). Efforts to end armed conflict in South Sudan have in the past not acknowledged that peace process do not only require the participation of the main parties but a broader inclusion of internal actors who represent the affected and non-combatants. When asked about the participation of actors in the formulation of the agreement, out of 384 respondents, 236 (61.5%) answered in the negative while 129 (33.5%) answered in the affirmative. Only 19 (5%) said they did not know.




Figure-3. Distribution of Responses Regarding Participation of Actors in the Formulation of the Agreement  
Source: Field Data, 2020

These findings reflect that participation of actors in the formulation of the agreement was generally low, which indicates a weakness in its design as has been pointed out by a number of scholars such as (Paffenholz, 2013) who argue that inclusive peace mechanisms may be either promoted or disrupted by social and political variables, and


that the nature of peace agreements, will form the level of representativeness and the distribution of power, thereby influencing possibility of achieving sustainable agreements.

In South Sudan, peace efforts such as R-ARCISS 2018 have attempted to increase the involvement of internal actors. These efforts have seen the involvement of civil society groups, political parties, and women's groups. This is linked to an understanding of how inclusion can be used to improve the quality and long-term viability of peace agreements (Paffenholz, 2015). It is thus undeniable that the involvement of more internal actors is vital in the implementation of peace agreements in South Sudan. However, mediators are always sceptical of too many internal actors since in such situations control is difficult and reaching a consensus may be time consuming. A case in point was the Somali peace process in Nairobi in 1995 where the number of delegations was too high to arrive at an amicable agreement.

Document Content Analysis findings reveal that, during the early phases of peace talks in early 2014 which led to the ARCISS 2015, the South Sudanese government, objected to the participation of all internal actors. Because not all internal groups were included in the negotiations, the process merely handled the power struggle between both the government and the SPLM/A-IO without solving the underlying national crisis. As a result of this weakness in the peace agreement's architectural design, the political process was guided toward a centralized power-sharing paradigm that favoured elites and individuals over regions and people. Yet scholars clearly point out that the possibility of reaching long-term agreements is influenced by design or process considerations (Paffenholz and Cindy, 2017). The degree of inclusivity and participation of key actors in the conflict is pertinent to achieving responsive peace agreements, while negotiating with fewer actors runs a risk of lacking the necessary authority and legitimacy.

#### 4.2. The Sequence of Acts Leading to the Peace Agreement

Respondents were asked whether there was a sequence of acts that led up to the signing of the Peace Agreement. Out of 384 respondents, 154 (40.1%) responded in the negative, saying it was isolated act, 119 (30.9%) said yes, it involved a sequence of acts, while 111 (29%) claimed to not know.



**Figure-4.** Distribution of Responses Regarding Sequence of Acts Leading to the Peace Agreement  
Source: Field Data, 2020

Although a large proportion (30.9%) indicated that the Peace Agreement was a culmination on a sequence of acts, which in itself is commendable, it appears the sequence was a replica of those followed before, that have not resulted in the optimal desired results. An analysis of peace agreements in South Sudan since the (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005) from Document Analyses seems to suggest that the mediation process having been led by IGAD, the structure, process, mediators, and the outcome seem to have followed a similar pattern. New procedures that could possibly elicit better outputs and outcomes were not pursued. The respondents were asked, "if recycling of ideas had led to the drafting of similar agreements without contextualizing the conflict." This was because, in some instances, peace agreements could be full of recycled failed ideas. Data were collected from respondents.

Out of 384 respondents, the majority, 120 (31.2%), agreed with the statement that, "recycling of ideas had led to the drafting of similar agreements without contextualizing the conflict." Although this was followed by more than (101) a quarter (26.4%) who were not sure and another about a quarter who disagreed at 93 (24.3%), it is evident that there was a regurgitation of ideas in peace agreements without a thorough analysis of the reason for their weakness and continued failure. This was thus partially responsible for the failure of peace agreements and the associated challenges in realizing durable SSRs in South Sudan. This agrees with Tchier (2019) in an article titled, "Why the latest peace deal in South Sudan won't hold" who argued that the R-ARCISS 2018 just recycled the former failed agreement (ARCISS 2015). Similarly, both ARCISS 2015 and R-ARCISS 2018 are a replica of the CPA most probably because no proper conflict analysis was conducted and there were too many assumptions one being that if the top leadership agree then the rest of the population agree and that there will be peace.

In the context of peace agreements signed in South Sudan, both local and foreign players have poorly articulated the definition of local ownership. Much as it is always possible to achieve a degree of consensus on the essence of a given problem and select suitable responses as their primary interlocutors between external actors and local political elites, this consensus may break down adversely undermining the effects of a specific intervention. Findings from Document Content Analysis indicate that this was the case of all the peace agreements in South Sudan. The tendency to engage with a limited circle of local actors during the intervention and overloading the peace process with external

solutions are believed to be the main constraints. The R-ARCISS 2018 agreement was signed by the TGoNU, the main opposition (South Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition-SPLM/A-IO), the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Prisoners (FD), and Other Opposition Parties (OPP) tried to bring on-board many actors. In 2015, the ARCISS 2015, supposedly a comprehensive peace agreement, was inked in by fewer signatories but quickly collapsed. The key difference between it and the current formula for power-sharing is that more individuals have been extended to include the envisaged cabinet and parliament.

### 4.3. Results on Ceasefire Agreement and Demobilization of Combatants

When asked whether or not the Peace Agreement had contained provisions for a ceasefire and demobilization of combatants, 92.5% responded in the affirmative, while 7.5% of respondents said that it had not.

**Table-1.** Peace Agreement Included a Ceasefire Agreement

	Yes	92.50%
	No	7.50%
<b>Total</b>		<b>100.0%</b>

Source: Field Data, 2020

Respondents were also asked if the Peace Agreement included demobilization of combatants. Out of 384, 230 (60%) responded in the negative, while only 79 (20.5%) responded in the affirmative. The rest 75(19.5%) said that they did not know. Mechanisms for the implementation of peace agreements may take several forms and exist to help improve the probability of achieving success. The primary emphasis on ensuring that ceasefire agreements are adhered to therefore compliance processes must be elaborate and feasible within the political and socio-economic context of the post conflict state. The compliance processes must include tasks that support the implementation and assure peaceful transition. These tasks, as seen in literature reviewed [Abdenur \(2018\)](#) include monitoring, verification, and documentation of weapons decommissioning, demobilization of armed forces, and breaches of ceasefire. In other types of peace negotiations, however, compliance mechanisms abound, addressing wider problems aimed not only at ending conflicts but also at developing democratic structures and institutions that can maintain peace. Contemporary implementation mechanisms help to enforce commitments in fields as diverse as land reform elections, power-sharing to reform the security sector, and the sharing of economic capital to ratify. It is important to build frameworks that can adapt to the growing complexity of peace agreements and play a role in improving the credibility of the agreement among the general public. In most cases, a wide variety of implementation mechanisms have been created by peace agreements to deliver various tasks across different contexts. It suffices to say that the implementation frameworks are highly dependent on the existing socio-political environment.

### 4.4. Potential of R-ARCISS 2018 in Addressing the Conflict in South Sudan

Focus Group Discussants were of the view that R-ARCISS had slim chances of succeeding in resolving the conflict, as one pointed out that it did not address issues of accountability and justice, it only focuses on the conflict. Although both agreements call for the creation of a hybrid court, as revealed by Document Content Analysis findings, (CHAPTER V. Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing of the ARCISS 2015) for the TGoNU, this has remained a tall order. This emanates from the fact that it has been untenable for the agreement to address historical grievances and injustices in South Sudan. Further, some of the people tasked with setting and strengthening it has been accused of being perpetrators of war crimes and atrocities. [Odhiambo \(2014\)](#), argues that: Track Two diplomacy has two broad objectives; first of all, it aims to reduce conflict between groups and nations by improving communication and understanding. It tries to lower anger, tension, fear, and misunderstanding. It tries to humanize the face of the enemy and get one group to understand the other group's point of view.

The establishment of the Hybrid court can be detrimental to the sustainable peace in South Sudan. Though [Owiso \(2018\)](#) argues that "the failure to engage in the transitional justice may have led to the armed conflict in 2013, there must be a balance between pursuing justice and achieving sustainable peace." [Akoï \(2021\)](#) posits that "since the GoSS presides over non-functional institutions while those that are in positions of authority are candidates for this court, its efficacy is not guaranteed." This puts to question their commitment. Though [Cox \(2019\)](#) argues that "post-conflict justice has a role in the sustainable peace, the choice of justice by those in power should reflect the structural conditions of the post-conflict environment." Though the population has high expectations with this court, the reality is that the court may not successfully prosecute those who had committed war crimes as well as oversee truth and reconciliation.

The agreement was also seen as lacking adequate time for implementation of the proposed clauses and charters. ARCISS 2015 was also limited by the lack of adequate provisions for DDR of armed groups. There were also no penalties for violators which could lead to security collapse. Furthermore, it did not address power-sharing wrangles within SPLM which was considered the root causes of conflicts. However, one participant of the FGD pointed out that it could succeed since it was legitimate, inclusive, and had the ability to cultivate and sustain interplay, trust, and cooperation.

Based on the perceptions of the interview and FGD participants, it can be deduced that the agreement has expanded provisions that could result in institutional reforms in the government as well as in the security sectors. It was also owned more by the various groups. The JMEC was also seen as being more capable. However, it had immense challenges related to addressing some of the most contentious issues such as power-sharing and DDR. The

timelines were not realistic and had been flouted time and again. Lack of clear frameworks to punish violators as well as the hybrid court whose constitution had been a major challenge meant that the agreement, just like its predecessor the ARCISS-2015 had grim prospects of success. Other members of the FDG were of the opinion that the quality of the agreement, ability of JMEC, inclusivity, and ownership would determine its success. Still, in agreement, another discussant believed the agreement would succeed.

## 5. Summary and Conclusions

The designs of both Peace Agreements are weak, and although the second one endeavoured to build on the first, it remained inherently weak as key elements in the people and process factors that would have made them strong were essentially overlooked. As far as the process is concerned, weaknesses appear primarily where there were a limited number of mechanisms to address impediments to the agreement, little agreement on the ownership of natural resources, inadequate modalities of navigating the interests of external actors, and poor handling of differing political interests. This led the study to conclude that the architectural design of the peace agreements was weak.

## Recommendation

It is recommended that a new process for a strong peace agreement be initiated, and that it should be preceded by rigorous baseline surveys so as to address some of the contentious root causes of the conflict such as negative ethnicity and militarisation along ethnic lines. To ensure a sound process, it is recommended that differing political interests, and those of external actors be properly analysed and addressed in a process that involves a sequence of acts encompassing a sound ceasefire agreement, demobilisation of combatants and strong mechanisms to arrest any impediments to the agreement, such as conflicts over ownership of natural resources.

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