Influence of the Kenya National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Framework on the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County

Odallo D. O. [*]
Department of Peace and Conflict Studies Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya
Email: eodhiambo@mmust.ac.ke

Professor Okoth P. G.
Department of Peace and Conflict Studies Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya
Email: pokoth@mmust.ac.ke

Professor Were M. E.
Department of Political Science and Peace Studies Kisii University, Kenya
Email: wearywere@gmail.com

*(Corresponding author)

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Abstract

Global experience with sustainable peacebuilding has been diverse since the term was formally introduced to the world by the United Nations in 1992. Since then, peacebuilding has been implemented in the absence of a universally accepted approach or clear criteria for success. Multiple actors have conceptualized and implemented peacebuilding to correspond with their contexts and needs. This is true for Kenya and Mombasa County, in particular. Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been conducting peacebuilding in the County, against the backdrop of old conflict drivers such as poverty and resource-based conflict, and emerging threats to peace such as drug trafficking and youth radicalization. Therefore, the ability of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to foster sustainable peacebuilding in these circumstances needs to be interrogated. The objective of this study was to examine the influence of the policy framework of the formal peacebuilding infrastructure in fostering sustainable peacebuilding. The conceptual framework was based on Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding, Galtung's Theory of Structural Violence, and Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory. The study adopted a descriptive survey research design and applied both convenience and purposive sampling techniques. Data was collected through semi-structured questionnaires, key informant interviews (KII), and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) guides and observation checklists. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for data analysis. The study findings indicated that Mombasa County Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are experiencing diminished agency because of a lack of resources to carry out peacebuilding work in the County. Those members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were not competent to undertake modern-day peacebuilding activities because of inadequate training. Therefore; the study recommends that the idea of peacebuilding through local peacebuilding structures such as Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees be a priority in Kenya's peacebuilding discourse with some modifications in the formation and functioning of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees should be de-linked from the county security processes and positioned as the "Honest Brokers for Peacebuilding", whose primary responsibility will be to harness all available resources in their locality to bear on their peacebuilding agenda. The national government should educate the public about peacebuilding and the role that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are expected to play in this agenda.

Keywords: Dynamics of peacebuilding; Formal peacebuilding infrastructure; Local peacebuilding.

1. Introduction

To deal effectively with peacebuilding, many countries have put in place systems and mechanisms to serve as vehicles for peacebuilding at a national and sub-national levels. These entities are known generally as local peacebuilding committees (LPCs). Globally, the role of these local peacebuilding entities is to support peacebuilding efforts in their communities using different approaches to the management of conflict. Olivier & Odendaal, cited in Issifu (2016) posit that the role of LPCs, formed at the level of a district, municipality, town, or village to encourage and facilitate inclusive peace-making and peacebuilding processes. Given the varied manner of their formation and existence, LPCs employ a variety of methods for conflict management including traditional advocacy, mediation, negotiation, agreement, consensus building, awareness creation, community-level capability building, and empowerment (Issifu, 2016; Nganje, 2021).

Kenya's peacebuilding agenda has benefitted from a long history of local peacebuilding committees; however, it was the unprecedented post-election violence of 2007/8 and the subsequent signing of the National Accord that gave new impetus to Kenya's local peacebuilding entities. Under agenda four (4) of the National Accord, several reforms were undertaken including the revamping of the National Secretariat for Peace Building and Conflict Management (known as the National Steering Committee-NSC) with a mandate to coordinate peacebuilding and conflict management interventions in Kenya. This process led to the drafting of the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015) and the emergence of a stronger national peace architecture in which local Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees (in some cases they are still referred to as DPCs) took the front seat. The Government issued an order that every County and Sub-county should have a peacebuilding entity, and if possible to the smallest administrative unit.

The development and launching of the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015), and the Standard Guidelines and Terms of Reference for Peace Structures (revised in 2016) set a new direction in Kenya's peacebuilding agenda for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. These entities that were hitherto seen as part of the county administration became the focus of county, sub-county, and even ward-level peacebuilding. However, the effectiveness of these entities in fostering sustainable peacebuilding remains opaque because of how they operate, and also because little has been done by way of evaluating their work.

One of the earliest reviews of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees conducted by Okumu (2010) found that the impetus for establishing peace committees was the desire to deal with recurrent conflicts in Kenya. Before 2010, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were known as District Peacebuilding Committees (DPCs) and were almost exclusively composed of well-known and reputable persons in their communities (business people, church leaders, and community notables) and retired civil servants (Okumu, 2010). Their moral standing in their communities gave them the power to push the peace agenda and, in some cases, this worked very well (Chivasa, 2022; Nganje, 2021). However, can these entities foster sustainable peacebuilding in their communities? Van has argued that in many conflict-affected countries local peace committees (LPCs) have had an impact on local communities by keeping the violence down, solving community problems, and empowering local actors to become peacebuilders. If this is so, can their work translate into a national peacebuilding agenda? These questions remain as more and more countries embrace the idea of national infrastructures for peace.

Despite the goodwill with which local peacebuilding entities have been received, questions about their true value in peacebuilding still linger. In the case of Kenya, changes in the composition of local peacebuilding entities as required by the new political dispensation (Constitution of Kenya, 2010) brought new dynamics that have increased the visibility of the local peacebuilding entities, but perhaps not their efficiency. Academic interest is now growing in this area with the main question being; what is the potential of these entities in fostering sustainable peacebuilding, be they informal (Adan, 2020; Chopra, 2008; Mungai *et al.*, 2020) or formal (Ernstorfer, 2018; Muigua, 2021; Nganje, 2021). As earlier noted, these entities are supposed to work in inclusive peace-making and peacebuilding processes. How effectively can they do this? The new set up of local peacebuilding entities under the National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management (NPBCM 2010) has raised policy, operational and programmatic questions, which form the basis of this research.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

Mombasa County has been known to experience cyclical and often protracted conflict incidents that have negatively impacted the peace of the County and by extension, Kenya as a whole. This conflict is prominent concerning ethnic animosity, political violence, radicalization, gender-based violence, and domestic terrorism (Elder *et al.*, 2014); County Government of Mombasa (2018), Rakodi *et al.* (2000). Despite many years and much investment by Government, Civil society, and religious leaders, the cycle and long history of conflict have not been broken. The establishment of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees, as a policy response in 2008 seems to have made no difference in the County. There are several stakeholders in the peace agenda of Mombasa including; the national and county government of Mombasa, the security forces, politicians and elites, and young people who are susceptible to radicalization and militias. All these have employed different strategies for peacebuilding that are yet to be interrogated. Secondly, how these different stakeholders interact with the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees and the factors that come into play greatly influence the peacebuilding agenda of the County and this needs to be probed. There is a clear need to interrogate the dynamics that influence the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees to understand the sustainable peacebuilding potential in Mombasa County.

Because of its economic importance, Mombasa County poses a major peacebuilding challenge for Kenya, and the East African region. It serves as the largest port of entry for Kenya and the larger East African trading block which now includes Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of

Congo. These countries have set to be fully economically integrated by 2063, and Mombasa holds the key to this integration process. Mombasa is also the most popular tourist destination on the Eastern Indian Ocean coast. These two factors, in addition to the need for a peaceful and prosperous Kenya, makes peacebuilding in Mombasa an important County agenda, in which local peacebuilding committees have a central role. However, even with an elaborate peace policy and County leadership in support, the effectiveness of the formal peacebuilding infrastructure in Mombasa remains unknown.

To date, the only assessment done by Onyago (2010) found that the Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were weak in terms of physical structures and equipment, a fact which severely compromised their functions. Onyago (2010) attributed this situation to the embryonic nature of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees even though they were borrowing from already working Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees from other parts of Kenya. Almost 10 years after this assessment, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have continued to expand and work in peacebuilding but with an unknown level of effectiveness.

The study is buoyed by the fact that peacebuilding has emerged as a global phenomenon in the process of conflict resolution. Philpott (2010), argues that since 1988, the world has entered into the "age of peacebuilding" in which the global trend is towards the settlements of conflict by other means rather than military might. This can be observed from the various and varying peacebuilding experiences in Palestine (Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, 2021) and even Iraq (Dodge, 2021). The African continent has witnessed peacebuilding efforts in several conflict theatres motivated by inter and intra-state conflict dynamics, for example in Sierra Leone (Millar, 2013). In Kenya, the prevalence of conflict in several regions manifests the inadequacy of sustainable peacebuilding structures and processes despite the various efforts expended by state and non-state actors at the national and county level, hence studies such as the present one (Githaiga, 2020; Muchanga, 2019; Muigua, 2021).

1.2. Research Objective

Examine the influence of the Kenya National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management framework on the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County.

1.3. Research Question

How does the existing policy framework influence Mombasa's formal peacebuilding infrastructure in convening, advocating, dialogue, and networking for sustainable peace?

1.4. Justification of the study
1.4.1. Academic Justification

Academic interest in peacebuilding is justified by the fact that research fulfills a very important concern which is to bridge the gap between practice and the conceptualization of peacebuilding interventions. This is important when considering the question of local-level peacebuilding because the efforts of peacebuilding are supposed to percolate and make a difference at the grassroots level. When it comes to local peacebuilding committees, much emphasis has been put on the bottom-up advantage of local peacebuilding approaches as opposed to top-down programs supported by international peacebuilding organizations. There is still a wide gap in the literature in understanding the dynamics that either link or separate these two approaches, and whether a hybrid of the two could foster sustainable peacebuilding (Neufeldt *et al.*, 2020).

This study set out to fill this gap by examining the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees from a policy framework perspective to fill this gap in the academic literature. The study further examined the peacebuilding strategies used by the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees from the angle of prescription or necessity to arrive at a more accurate assessment of the efficacy of these entities. By putting these two aspects of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees assessment, the study hoped to fill this academic gap in the study of peace and conflict studies. Moreover, Paffenholz (2021) has argued that the assumption of cause-effect problem-solving approaches to peacebuilding is now obsolete because peacebuilding has so many moving parts that it cannot follow a linear route. Mombasa County offers an opportunity for testing some of these assumptions because old and new threats to peace have converged to make the County a peacebuilding challenges.

1.4.2. Philosophical Justification

An African proverb credited to the Somali people says that *"the best bed that a man can sleep on is peace"*.The proverb reflects a community's philosophical approach to peace and likens peace to a state of tranquility, in which, even though sleep may increase a person's vulnerability, peace makes it possible for one to sleep. The analogy of the bed connotes a culture of peace in which the society cultivates a broad consensus of peace which allows hope to turn into trust. The question then becomes; can local peacebuilding foster a culture of peace? In pursuing a culture of peace through Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees, the National Government has put in place the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management which envisions a Kenyan peacebuilding architecture in which all stakeholders have an equal say in their peace through equitable participation.

A culture of peace does not assume the non-existence of conflict, but rather a consistent and sustainable way of ensuring that conflicts do not become violent by instituting mechanisms, both formal and informal that ensure that these conflicts do not escalate into violence (Ercoşkun, 2021). However, Bar-Tal (2009) argues that the challenge to the culture of peace is to be found in the temporary resolution of conflict through approaches like mediation and negotiation and the lack of true reconciliation that changes the societal view of the conflict. This study attempted to

view Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa as one way of building a culture for peace given the long history of conflict in the County.

1.4.3. Policy Justification

Kenya has developed and is implementing the National Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Policy of 2011. The optimistic argument in the policy document is that a multi-sectoral, multi-pronged approach to peacebuilding will somehow guarantee a peaceful nation. At the same time, Mombasa County has elaborated its policy framework for preventing and countering violent extremism, (MCAP/PCVE) based on the Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). Both policies need to be informed by credible knowledge of the efficacy of the peacebuilding infrastructure in the county. Kenya has been a beneficiary of foreign assistance in its peacebuilding efforts for a long time, starting from the UN, and the EU and from bilateral such as USAID, and DfID. The interest from international benefactors comes with intended and unintended consequences, which at times distorts policy. For, example, the UN has been criticized and praised in equal measure for the intended and unintended outcomes of peacebuilding (Gisselquist, 2018; Tschirgi, 2004). This also explored the perspectives of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees regarding partnerships and how these arrangements either supported or hindered their work.

2. Global Peacebuilding Frameworks and Policies

Global peacebuilding frameworks include the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Development Goal 16); the 2016 twin Security Council and General Assembly resolutions (S/RES/2282 and A/RES/70/262). In addition to the SDGs, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, (UNSCR/1325); the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, and the Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda (UNSCR/2250 and 2419), spell out the agency of young people and their capacity to contribute to peace, the Sustaining Peace Agenda (United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 2282, the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and State-building, or the New Deal, and the global peacebuilding funding and financing.

These frameworks have guided peacebuilding interventions across the world since the formal introduction of peacebuilding as a concept in the global peace agenda. The trend in these global frameworks has been to steer peacebuilding towards the liberal peace model which emphasizes issues such as democratization, free markets, and human rights, yet somehow attempts to infuse and promote local participation. This has been a difficult approach because liberal peace concepts, important as they are, often do not support local agencies in peacebuilding due to their top-down approach and exclusionist approach to peacebuilding. Further, the liberal peace theory that prosperity somehow prevents conflict has not been borne out in reality (Tanabe, 2017). This has been a major weakness of the liberal policy approach to peacebuilding.

After much criticism of the narrow, often inadequate approach of liberal peacebuilding, there seems to be a new trend in policy frameworks in favor of more inclusive approaches that expand the constituency for peacebuilding and thus increasing the chances of sustainable peace (Richmond, 2015; Selby, 2013; Tanabe, 2017). Otherwise known as "Hybrid Peacebuilding" as argued by Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015), this idea proposes the amalgamation of local and liberal practices of peacebuilding. In many ways, the emergence of modern local peacebuilding committees reflects the hybrid nature of peacebuilding in which local peacebuilding approaches and institutions are merged with formal peacebuilding entities which can apply both the law and tradition to resolve conflict and create peace. Much support for hybridity in peacebuilding has come from sociologists who argue that precolonial societies had perfected their peacebuilding methods long before colonialism appeared and insisted on defining peace on their terms (Boege, 2011).

After resolution 2250, the United Nations, under the umbrella of the Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding produced a Practice Note to propose to policymakers, and donors programming considerations for supporting young people's participation in peacebuilding, in line with the Guiding Principles and Security Council Resolution 2250. Specifically, the practice note discusses the issues of quality and sustainability of peacebuilding interventions, evidence-based peacebuilding interventions involving youth, and the interconnectedness of peacebuilding with other development processes.

This holistic approach demonstrated the evolving policy atmosphere in peacebuilding at the global level. Based on the UNSCR 2250, other youth peacebuilding frameworks have been developed, such as the African Union Continental Framework for Youth, Peace, and Security whose objective is to facilitate the meaningful engagement and participation of African youth in all spectrums of peace and security at national, regional and continental levels. Kenya has also elaborated the Kenya Youth Development Policy (2019) in which youth will be engaged in promoting peace and fighting radicalization through education and increased employment opportunities. The inclusion of youth in peace negotiations from the beginning has also proven to be beneficial if their support for future peacebuilding interventions will be required. In the case of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), South Sudanese youth were involved in the negotiations in 2017 and this inclusion helped shape the conversation that broadened the addition of non-political stakeholders in the implementation mechanisms. It was the inclusion of youth that led to the creation of a youth ministry led by young people at the national level and the prioritization of young people's participation in all peace implementation mechanisms (Malish, 2021)

Another noticeable trend in peacebuilding has been the increase in coalitions and partnerships building in peacebuilding interventions. The advantage of partnerships in peacebuilding is clear and accepted by all peacebuilding stakeholders. Nearly all international policy frameworks give provision for some kind of partnership and coalition building in peacebuilding. Both UN Security Council Resolutions A/70/262 and S/2016/2282, and

Sustainable Development Goal 17, Target 17, recognize that the scale and nature of sustaining peace need strong, strategic, and durable partnerships (Coalition Resource, 2017).

Partnerships and coalitions touch on a key peacebuilding problem which is the notion that peacebuilding has been dominated by "outsiders" who come to support "insiders" to return to peace after a conflict. Over time the dichotomy of "outsiders" (foreigners) versus "insiders" (locals) has affected peacebuilding, especially when peacebuilding is seen as an "outsider" initiative. In addition, as argued by Kolk and Lenfant (2015) the different typologies of partnerships at different levels, i.e. local, national and international, and the unique contributions of each level of partnerships have not been scrutinized fully and their contribution to peacebuilding fully appreciated.

While these developments are ongoing, certain residual issues about peacebuilding need to be brought to the fore. The problem of peacebuilding language continues to distort the potential impact of peacebuilding. It has itself contributed to the confusion in peacebuilding discourse. Connolly and Laura (2018) argue that the language reflects relationships of power in which the poor conflict-wrecked countries of the Global South are seen as inferior to the more peaceful, richer Global North, who are the benefactors of peacebuilding. Therefore, terms such as "global" refer implicitly to those in the Global North, specifically Western Europe and the United States of America while "local", on the other hand, refers to individuals and groups living largely in the Global South, especially in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Connolly further argues that labels such as "partner", "participant" and "beneficiary", are not neutral, but instead imply a provider and recipient relationship. Argues that when it comes to definitions, 'international society is used to denote outsiders and does not include local actors implying that peacebuilding is still seen very much through the "we" and "them" divide. The language in USAID's peacebuilding approach, for example, states that USAID works with local partners and field missions to address the legacy of violence through activities such as support to local and regional peace processes, restorative justice programs, ethnic dialogue, interfaith peacebuilding, inclusive and legitimate governance structures, and grassroots reconciliation (USAID 2021).

The statement is clearly and specifically meant for the countries in the global south where terms like "local" "grassroots" and "ethnic" are usually used to refer to recipients who receive USAID support. USAID works almost exclusively in the Global South; Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Peacebuilding support by most donor countries focuses on Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the so-called "countries in conflict" or "recovering from conflict". These regions have traditionally been conflicted areas and might continue to be so for the foreseeable future because most issues that precipitate their conflicts remain largely ignored. A major policy direction in future support to these regions will depend on how "conflict" and "peacebuilding" are defined. Sherriff *et al.* (2018) argue that policy change towards more "local peacebuilding", in line with United Nations Resolution 2282 will influence peacebuilding support to include efforts before, during, and after violent conflict, rather than the old way of peacebuilding support which focused on rapid democratization, free and globalized markets and rule of law through external intervention. This is a notable critical policy shift that not only redefines peacebuilding but also the resources that will be put behind peacebuilding. This trend was also argued by Lotz (2012), under the Aid Effectiveness debate in which changing patterns for peacebuilding support seem to be focusing more on how peacebuilding funding could be used more effectively, but less on what impact they are having on the ground.

2.1. Policy Frameworks for Peacebuilding in Africa

Peacebuilding in Africa has been viewed as unfinished business that is characterized by what Shaw (2003) argues to be conflict situations with diversities in both causes and courses. This situation has been traced back to Africa's colonial legacy, rooted in poor governance, and contested nationalities. Nearly every aspect of peacebuilding has featured in the African scene including conflict prevention; early warning systems; mediation and conflict management; post-conflict reconstruction; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR), human rights, and justice. Specialized program on the role of women, youth, religion, humanitarianism, grassroots organizations, and regional and continental bodies. Even with all these interventions, Africa has still considered a conflicted continent in need of constant outside help to consolidate peace. In comparison to other continents, Africa has had the biggest challenge to peace and perhaps the most intense attempts at peacebuilding due to long periods of conflicts that have tended to be very costly in terms of human and other resources (Jackson, 2000).

Despite these obvious institutional challenges, Africa has collaborated with partners and attempted to support peacebuilding whenever necessary. For, example, Dzinesa and Curtis (2012) observe that by 2011, of the sixteen United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the world, seven were in Africa. The first five countries on the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) were all in Africa: Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, and Liberia. The first four cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC) were also all African: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, and the CAR. This situation paints a picture of a continent with serious peace challenges, but also one which has attempted to build peace.

Africa has experienced many violent inter and intra-state conflicts that have resulted in the diversion of a significant portion of resources, including official development assistance, away from development to emergency services. Aremu (2010), argues that the history of Africa as a continent is replete with conflict to the extent that it may be concluded that the major current that runs throughout the African continent is war. This is not unusual in long-drawn-out conflicts. In many instances, what begins as a minor domestic problem quickly grows and soon becomes internationalized, as was the case of the Sierra Leone and Liberian wars. Among the international factors, particularly noteworthy are the consequences derived from the end of the Cold War and its aftermath, as well as the

globalization and liberalization of the world economy - which have generated a sense of political and economic insecurity in Africa. Discussions on peacebuilding must therefore follow this logic.

The quality of governance and respect for institutions determines the level of peace and stability in a country (Werner, 2019). This is true for Africa, as it is for any other part of the world, but this point is critical for Africa because most conflicts have arisen out of "governance issues". Fashagba and Oshewolo (2014) argue that while some students of peace see good governance as the result of peace, others emphasize that good governance is a requirement for sustainable peace. Either way, one cannot exist without the other. In some cases, the "democratic deficit", as defined by the monopoly of power by a few, has been identified as the cause of state failure, hence violent conflict (Raz, 2018). In some cases, the conflict has been precipitated by ethnic identity in the multi-ethnic nature of countries whose borders were arbitrarily drawn in complete disregard for indigenous communities or the way they organized their affairs (Gbenenye, 2016).

2.2. Kenya Peacebuilding Architecture and Policy Framework

Kenya's peacebuilding architecture is structured around Governmental institutions (such as peacebuilding committees (formal and informal), national security forces, and county administration) and Non-Governmental institutions (NGOs), international and regional partners, and a host of local peacebuilding stakeholders functioning at the community and village level to ensure peace and security. Peacebuilding in Kenya is guided by the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. This elaborate document lays out how Kenya Government hopes to ensure sustainable peace in the country and beyond. The vision of the policy is to enhance coordination in the prevention, mitigation, and management of conflicts as well as sustained peacebuilding processes in the most participatory, culturally sensitive, inclusive, transparent, and accountable manner. This policy framework is the Government's deliberate effort towards developing a comprehensive, legal and administrative mechanism to govern peacebuilding and conflict management processes in the country (Government of Kenya, 2015).

The policy itself was a long time in the making because of the long processes of consultation that the policy had to go through. A Peacebuilding stakeholder, such as the Kenya Peace Conference (KPC), which is a network of organizations committed to peace in Kenya acknowledges that the process, though long, was necessary.

In 2018, the Government passed the National Cohesion and which provided for the establishment of the National Cohesion and Peace Building Commission. The main purpose of the Commission was to collaborate with stakeholders to ensure national cohesion and promote peaceful coexistence, among other things, to investigate and prosecute any deliberate acts or utterances that constitute a threat to peace. Peacebuilding is defined in the Act as, non-military measures and interventions targeted at any community in Kenya for (a) achieving sustainable peace; (b) resolving an ongoing inter-communal or intra-communal conflict; (c) reconciling communities; or (d) reducing or eliminating the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening the social, economic, environmental, cultural and political capacities of the community (GoK, 2018).

Adan and Pkalya (2006), trace the development of Kenyan local peacebuilding committees to the early 1990s in Wajir, with the establishment of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) in 1995. This was done out of the deep frustrations felt by many residents at the failure of the government to resolve conflict in and among the different Somali clans living in Northern Kenya. In 1994, market women, led by one Dekha Ibrahim, a peace crusader in the County, organized themselves into a peace group and brought in other clan members to strategize on how to bring peace. This mediation and reconciliation process expanded into the county, among clan members, youth, and even Government officers, and in 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was created as part of the district security committee.

Within the context of formal infrastructure for peace (I4P), Local Peacebuilding Committees have been the glue that holds all the pieces together, so to speak. Local Peacebuilding Committees have been the centerpiece in the "local turn" debate in peacebuilding which, is an attempt to put local communities at the center of their peacebuilding efforts (Adan and Pkalya, 2006; Nganje, 2020; Odendaal, 2012). Amid their popularity, certain questions have arisen. For example, where should the line be drawn between justice and peace? Under what kind of policy frameworks should local peacebuilding committees operate? Irene (2018), argues that over time, two main categories of local peace committees have emerged; the formal state-recognized Local Peacebuilding Committees and the informal ones that normally operate at the grassroots level, both of which are very important and have been useful in sustainable peacebuilding.

Kenya's peacebuilding agenda has been tested by the militaristic response to the terrorist group, Al-Shabaab which has been a thorn in the flesh because of its indiscriminate killings in the Country (Lind *et al.*, 2017). On 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to launch a military offensive against al-Shabaab. Titled Operation *Linda Nchi* (Protect the Country), the operation was necessitated by the constant armed raids that al-Shabaab had been conducting in Kenya since 2008. Anderson and McKnight (2015) argue that rather than eradicate al-Shabaab, the blowback from the invasion has been very costly for Kenya with bombings in Nairobi, Garissa, and Mombasa. It has been argued that the group has maximized local political wrangles to make incursions and gain favor in Kenya, among the disgruntled populace in the Coast and North Eastern.

To respond to terrorism more effectively, Kenya passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 30 of 2012 (revised in 2019). A major problem with the implementation of the anti-terrorism act has been the response of the Kenyan security forces. The method of choice has been the carrying out of collective punishment often in naked violation of any human rights. Mass arrests are carried out indiscriminately, often netting the innocent while the culprits go Scott-free (Wakube *et al.*, 2017) Programs such as *Usalama* Watch undoubtedly alienated Kenya's Somalis and Muslims and were deeply felt in Garissa and other parts of Kenya. It can be argued, therefore, that the

response to terrorism, even with a clear Anti-terrorism Act has not gained nor built peace (Torbjörnsson and Jonsson, 2016). Odhiambo (2014), argues that: Track Two diplomacy has two broad objectives; first of all, it aims to reduce conflict between groups and nations by improving communication and understanding. It tries to lower anger, tension, fear, and misunderstanding. It tries to humanize the face of the enemy and get one group to understand the other group's point of view.

3. Conceptual Framework

Wasike and Odhiambo (2016), discuss the role of theories in guiding the thrust of academic studies. They emphasize the importance of theories in offering compelling and incisive causal explanations with calculated precision. They buttress their argument by quoting Smith (1986) who asserts that theories play the role of predicting, prescribing, and evaluating socio-political phenomena hence they cannot be ignored.

3.1. Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding

Galtung's thinking about peace is a long history of lifelong engagement with peace as a concept and the whole question of how the world could experience peace without any threat to that peace. In 1967, Galtung wrote that to write about peace is to write about everything and nothing. By this, Galtung attempted to express the all-encompassing nature of peace because it cannot be separated from life as we know it. Galtung began by suggesting that peace was an umbrella concept and a general expression of human desires, and that which is ultimate to be pursued (Galtung, 1967). Galtung further suggested that peace could not be given only one special meaning to do so, then it would lose its encompassing meaning. Therefore, Galtung argues, peace cannot mean simply the absence of organized group violence, but it must respond to their lived experiences so that they can endow it with the meanings that are important to them, hence maintaining its umbrella concept. Further, Galtung expounded on the idea of peace from three arguments; peace as equilibrium, peace as the absence of violence, and peace as cooperation among nations and groups. These ideas have influenced peaceful thinking for a long time.

In 1975, Galtung coined the term "peacebuilding" in his pioneering work "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding. In this treatise, Galtung attempted to place peace in the context of a world that was changing rapidly against the backdrop of WWII which left millions dead and a world very terrified of another similar experience. In the three approaches, Galtung distinguishes the three ideas of peace starting from peacekeeping, which is the exercise of keeping physical distance between two belligerents to peacemaking which is the implementation of peace agreements without attempting to address the root causes of conflict. These two represent what Galtung called negative peace, which is hard to sustain. In Galtung's view, the ideal situation is to have positive peace because this is the only peace that is self-sustaining. Galtung, therefore, came up with the term peacebuilding which he defines as the process of creating self-supporting structures in society that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to conflict. This definition moves the idea of peace from traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking both of which Galtung saw as having shortcomings in a world needing sustainable peace. Galtung's view of peace is that it must be positive for it to be sustainable. Juma and Odhiambo (2021), posit that the fervor for regionalism is etched in the minds of the political class globally. Some advocate for continental integration while others call for regional groupings that consist of a few states whose defining criterion is territorial contiguity for the desire for sustainable peace.

According to Galtung, conflicts erupt because of the failure to meet basic human needs, not because of scarcity but because of bad policies which introduce inequity in society and perpetuate structural violence. In this situation, peace would then represent the reduction or removal of the deleterious impact of these bad policies. Peace according to Galtung has a structure that, if applied correctly should address the root causes of conflict and build the way to sustainable peacebuilding. This conceptualization of peace has not been received without criticism. Cravo (2017) points out some omissions in Galtung's peace theory, for example, the lack of clarity on what criteria are to be used in measuring the equitable distribution of state resources. Galtung is also criticized for seemingly suggesting that the reasons behind violence and conflict are purely economic and political. This has not been borne out in today's where faith-based conflicts have also emerged.

In 2000, Galtung further advanced his thinking in peacebuilding by introducing the TRANSCEND method of peaceful conflict transformation. According to Galtung, the TRANSCEND method is based on the core idea that to prevent violence and develop the creative potential of a conflict, there has to be transformation. The root of the method is the understanding of conflict as incompatible goals, and incompatible parties. The separation of people and the problem to be solved is achieved through dialogue based on empathy, non-violence, and joint creativity (Galtung, 2000).

3.2. Galtung's Concept of Structural Violence

In his research paper entitled "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Galtung (1969) argued that.

"Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (Galtung, 1969).

Galtung further argued that the inequality in the distribution of power is a clear manifestation of structural violence. Dilts *et al.* (2012), posit that structural violence is everything that hinders individuals from developing their capabilities, dispositions, or possibilities to meet their basic needs. On the other hand, Christie (1997), arguing from a human needs theory, posits that structural violence occurs when economic and political structures systematically deprive certain segments of society of meeting their basic needs, such as security, identity, well-being, and self-determination.

Structural violence produces and reproduces episodes of human rights abuse in almost all its forms because of its insidious nature. South Africa provides an example where long after the collapse of the apartheid regime and ascendance of a democratically elected Government to power, the legacy of apartheid which perpetuated both direct and structural violence against the majority still lingers. Taking a human rights perspective, Evans (2016) argues that the continued lack of access to land for most South Africans, post-apartheid, is, in fact, structural violence in the continuation of apartheid.

Structural violence has been studied in Kenya by many students of peacebuilding, for example, Roberts (2009), Murithi (2008), and Ochieng (2010). Murithi (2008), using the example of post-election violence in 2008, argues that the election seemed to have been a trigger of deep-seated structural violence in Kenya, as demonstrated by continued poor governance and corruption that has kept the majority landless, poor, unemployed and hungry. The same conclusion was arrived at by Sifuma (2011) who, in a study of post-election structural violence in Kenya argues that the post-election violence was caused by inadequate structures that did not address the plight of many Kenyans such as equitable distribution of resources, access to land, discrimination of women, entrenched corruption and impunity, marginalization of minority communities, poverty, and unemployment among the youth. The author further suggested that perpetrators of structural violence need to be held accountable for their crimes if the country is to move forward.

Mombasa County has been determined to suffer from poverty and historical injustices which can be defined as structural violence (Otieno, 2019). A rapid assessment in Mombasa County, in June 2017 under the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT) project of the Kenya Accountable Devolution Program found that Mombasa County's troubled history of conquest and subjugation has contributed to the marginalization of the indigenous population in terms of lack of access to land, education, and citizenship rights, all of which have been defined as structural violence. These factors have greatly contributed to the current challenges around youth unemployment and associated dangers such as petty crimes and gang activity. Marginalization and land grievances feed into the radicalization narratives which results in the recruitment of youth into terrorist activities. In the same vein, Mkutu *et al.* (2021) argue that youth criminality in Mombasa can also be viewed from a structural violence perspective where youth are also victims of marginalization and unfavorable environments, which constrain life choices, making violent crime a frequent path. Moreover, as studies have shown, criminal justice approaches have failed these youths through inconsistent, corrupt, and brutal approaches by police services (Chitembwe and Odhiambo, 2021).

3.3. Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory

In Lederach (2003) definition, conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships. Lederach, cited in Miall (2004) stated that,

Conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily "see" the setting and the people in it as the "problem" and the outsider as the "answer". Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting (Lederach, 2003).

Lederach (1995), further argues that this process provides transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organization and realities. Conflict transformation involves the complete change of the situations that support violence, in comparison to the other two approaches to peace that is, conflict resolution and conflict management, which do not seek to uproot conflict as it were.

Lederach (2003), likens conflict transformation to the workings of a human being who has a head, heart, arms, and feet. These components are similar to those in a society where different dynamics operate in what can be called "social interaction". The head, argues Lederach refers to the conceptual view of the conflict, how it is thought about, and therefore prepares to approach conflict. The approach to conflict is influenced by attitudes, perceptions, and orientations. According to Lederach, the capacity to envision and react positively to conflict creates the potential for a transformative result. A transformational approach recognizes that conflict is a normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships, which has ebbs and flows.

The heart is the center of our hidden emotions, intuitions, and spiritual life, in the same way, some of our social relations are visible, and those that are invisible. Lederach points out that conflict flows from life and therefore the issues upon which people fight need careful consideration. The hands are capable of building things and we need to inject constructive solutions to conflicts. Legs and feet represent the place where we touch the ground, and therefore, where thought and heartbeat translate into response, direction, and momentum. Conflict transformation needs to be responsive to real-life challenges, needs, and realities. In essence, a transformational view engages must help reduce violence and increase justice in human relationships (Lederach, 2003).

Lederach (1995) conflict transformation model presented in figure 1.

**Figure-1.** The Big Picture of Conflict Transformation

Source: Lederach (1995).

3.4. Conceptual Model
## 3.4.1. Conceptual Framework Model

Figure-2. Conceptual Model Showing interaction of variables

Source: Researcher, 2022

4. Research Methodology

4.1. Research Design

The study adopted the descriptive survey design, because of the opportunity that the method offers for studying LPCs. Aggarwal and Ranganathan (2019) define the descriptive research design as a method that allows the researcher to study and describe the distribution of one or more variables in a study sample at one specific point in time without trying to make inferences or causal statements. Mugenda and Mugenda, cited in Asenahabi (2019) point out that the survey method is the process of collecting data from a sample group to determine the status of that group at that time concerning one or more variables.

This study took into consideration the versatility of the design as enabling the researcher to describe systematically and accurately the facts and characteristics of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. This study aimed to provide, as accurately as possible, the description of formal peacebuilding entities in Mombasa County and assess their ability to effectively foster a sustainable peacebuilding agenda for Mombasa County.

4.2. Study Area

This research was done in Mombasa County. The county was selected because of the persistent land-based and ethnic conflicts that have been witnessed in the County, which, unlike other parts of Kenya, has the potential of

internationalizing domestic conflict due to the emerging illicit drug trafficking and the advent of international terrorism that have both taken root in the County (Botha, 2014; Onguny and Taylor, 2019; Rakodi *et al.*, 2000). Mombasa County has a long history of many peacebuilding attempts amid new and old challenges, however, not much of it has been studied.


Figure-3. Map of Mombasa County
Source: GIS Expert, prepared from Kenya National Bureaus of Statistics 2021

Mombasa County lies to the east of Kenya, along the Indian Ocean Coast (Lat: -4.043740, Long: 39.658871), and is the premier trading port for Kenya and East Africa, as well as the premier destination for tourists, both local and international. In Kiswahili, Mombasa is called "*Kisiwa Cha Mvita*", which means "Island of War" due to the many violent changes in its administration over the years. Many nationalities have had a say on the Island at one time or another; Africans, Persians, Arabs, Portuguese, and British as far back as the 6th century AD. Mombasa County is host to Kenya's second-largest city of Mombasa, which is cosmopolitan with almost all Kenyan people living here. The County has six sub-counties that also act as electoral constituencies: Mvita, Changamwe, Kisauni, Jomvu, Nyali, and Likoni.

The economy of the county can be described as mixed with agriculture, manufacturing, maritime activities, and tourism is the mainstay of the County. Among these, tourism which contributes to 68% of the wage employment is the leading employer generating both formal and informal employment. Other economic activities are fishing, farming of sisal, sugarcane, cashew nuts, coconuts, and livestock farming. Much of the farming of foodstuff is for subsistence at the household level. Various manufacturing firms have set up bases in the County including cement companies, petroleum refining, food processing, and salt production (County Government of Mombasa, 2021).

The British quickly consolidated their control over Mombasa and the whole of East Africa and built a railway line in the early 1900s from Mombasa to Uganda. This increased the importance of Mombasa as a port city, which it is up to today. In the middle of the exchange of power between the Portuguese, the British, and Omani Arabs were the issue of land which had been taken from indigenous Mijikenda people who were treated as irrelevant in the power struggle. Kanyinga (2000), in a paper titled *The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya*, argues that the land problem started with the Arab slave trade in the 19th century when Kenya's coastal region was loosely federated to the Sultanate of Zanzibar and which continued when the region became a British protectorate. Huge sisal plantations were created in former indigenous lands without any compensation. As time went by, the absence of a comprehensive land policy on the Mijikenda who has lost land worsened, and the locals found themselves as squatters on their land. Subsequent Governments in independent Kenya did little to solve the problem, thus driving many locals to continued poverty. Rakodi *et al.* (2000) summarises the problem of conflict in Mombasa today as associated with urban poverty that has created the breeding ground for radicalization, political patronage, and corruption. The unresolved land issues and lack of basic services have also affected the peace of the county and built the road to youth radicalization.

Mombasa's conflict problem cannot be divorced from the 2007/8 post-election conflict because the real drivers of the conflict have remained unresolved since Kenya's independence in 1963. These include exclusionary and oppressive rule, the use of ethnicity for political ends, inequitable distribution and access to vital resources, corruption, limited democratic space, limited rule of law, and lack of respect for fundamental rights. The suffering, death, and displacement has been associated with cyclic electoral problems witnessed in Kenya since the return of multiparty politics in 1992. The post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 differed only in geographic scope and impact on lives, communities, and the economy. Ethnicity continues to play an inordinate role in Kenyan political life and the 2008 post-election violence played out largely on ethnic lines, fueled by grievances over land, privilege, and inequality (Gathiaka, 2021).

4.3. Study Population

The study focused on the members of the 6 Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees which was the focus of the study. At the time of fieldwork, the population of the committees was 250, and 113 were recruited into the study. Senior Government officials in Mombasa County including Sub-county Commissioners, Security personnel, and Ward Administrators totaled about 51, and 11 were recruited into the study. The study could not ascertain the exact number of youths who collaborate with the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and therefore relied on the *mask* contacts maintained by Ward administrators. From this, 185 youths belonging to different *masks* were identified and recruited into the study. This process also helped to identify 7 reformed youths who were included in the study as well. Similarly, to arrive at a random sample of villagers, the researcher utilized the Nyumba Kumi register at the ward level to identify and recruit 72 members of households who were recruited into the study. Through working with the Chairpersons of the s of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, 4 representatives of NGOs that collaborate with the committees were also identified and recruited into the study. A total of 390 respondents participated in the study.

4.4. Data Collection Methods

Data were collected through four methods: Key Informant Interviews (KII), Focus Group Discussions, Semi-structured Questionnaires, and an Observation checklist. Secondary data was also collected through the perusal of relevant documents helped by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, their partners, and the National Steering Committee such as annual reports, end-of-project reports, and minutes of meetings.

4.5. Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The total sample size for the study was 392 respondents sampled from seven categories of respondents. The study adopted different sampling techniques because of the different kinds of respondents envisaged. In this study, convenience sampling was applied for the selection of the respondents from the Sub-county peacebuilding committee because of their relatively small number and availability driven by the fact that membership into these committees is voluntary and the researcher had to depend on both their availability and willingness to participate.

Convenience sampling had been used in peacebuilding studies, for example, Palinkas *et al.* (2015) point out that this method is widely used for the identification and selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest. In this study, the senior government officials, youths, and village elders were considered information-rich in terms of the work of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees.

4.6. Data Collection Procedures

The study utilized both primary and secondary data collection techniques. Data collection was done between August 2021 and March 2022. Out of the total study sample of 392, 113 respondents who were the core members of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees were subjected to the semi-structured questionnaire, 20 respondents were interviewed through Key Informant guides, and the balance of the respondents was interviewed in Focus Group Discussions in 32 focus groups.

4.7. Data Analysis

The study used the identification of patterns to make sense of the KIIs and FGDs to supplement the information from the quantitative data. Quantitative data were analyzed using versions SPSS 24 and 26.

5. Findings

5.1. Awareness of the National Policy Framework by Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding infrastructure

Respondents were asked to state whether they were aware of the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, and further to give their opinion as to whether the policy provided them with enough guidance. Respondents were further asked to indicate whether they were aware of other peacebuilding policies. The results are contained in table 1.

Table-1. Awareness of Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management

Awareness of policy framework	Whether LPCs are aware of Kenya national policy on peace building and conflict management		Whether National Policy on Peacebuilding and conflict provides guidance on how to conduct peacebuilding activities in Mombasa County		Whether LPC is aware of other peacebuilding policies and documents in Kenya	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	22	19.5	21	18.6	16	14.2
Disagree	41	36.3	51	45.1	33	29.2
Undecided	14	12.4	5	4.4	15	13.3
Agree	31	27.4	31	27.4	30	26.5
Strongly Agree	5	4.4	5	4.4	19	16.8
Total	113	100.0	113	100.0	113	100.0

Source: field data, 2021

The study found that out of the 113 respondents, 19.47% (N=22) strongly disagreed with the question, 36.28% (N=41) disagreed, 12.4% (N=14) were undecided, 27.43% (N=3) agreed to the inquiry and 4.2% (N=5) strongly agreed that they were aware of the policy. Cumulatively, 68.2% (N=77) were unaware of the policy and only 32.8% (N=36) indicated that they were aware of the policy. This finding shows that awareness of the policy that is supposed to guide the work of the peacebuilding infrastructure in Mombasa County was very low. The low level of awareness is not surprising because Kenya, like many African countries, has carried out peacebuilding as post-conflict projects supported by donor countries or has responded to conflict through security apparatus, in which case the applicable policies were those of security rather than peacebuilding. Peacebuilding policies are therefore a new approach to consolidating the peace dividend which is rarely portrayed as such. In general, policy awareness on almost any issue in Kenya has been very low. For example, Kaleli *et al.* (2021) found poor awareness of public policy when examining the role of public relations in sensitizing the public on Government Projects in Kenya.

Peacebuilding activities in Kenya are still held under the auspices of the County Peace and Security Committee, therefore the image of peacebuilding is that of the security of the community and not necessarily their peace. Secondly, there is usually a heavy representation of the national security apparatus in most of the peacebuilding operations in Kenya. This study got the impression that any matter to be clarified on the peacebuilding policy falls under the purview of the County Administration. As summarised by a public administrator during the KII.

We have a policy document that is creating a vacuum between Sub-county Peace Committees and the *Ngao* (public administration). We need structure and policies to guide them. In the recruitment, we need to recruit people with no other role and develop them in that area of being a DCP member so that they can fully dedicate and support the work we are doing in peacebuilding. We need to train them on what we want to achieve. If we do so, we are going to have better results. (KII interview with Sub-county administrator, Nyali September 30, 2021).

In the case of Kenya, Ernstorfer (2018), notes that it is one of the few countries with a national peacebuilding strategy, however, the implementation of the strategy is still weak. There are several entities at the government level in charge of various levels of peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities, composed of the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission. In the office of the President, there is a Presidential Adviser on Social Cohesion, Peace, and Conflict Resolution, whose job is to foster trust-building between civil society and the state. Because of the different players, the policy atmosphere is confused with various multi-stakeholder peacebuilding efforts coordinated by different groups with changing levels of membership, leadership, effectiveness, and impact. It is almost a situation of too many cooks spoiling the broth.

5.2. Training of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee Members on a Policy Framework

To fully understand the issue of capacity building, the study posed the question of topics that the respondents had been trained in. The results are contained in figure 4.

Figure-4. Training of Members of peacebuilding committees

Source: Field Data 2021

From the responses above, it would appear that the capacity building for Mombasa County's peace infrastructure is in line with the training that is carried out by the NSC. Most of the respondents had received training in peacebuilding as reported by 27.4% (N=30), followed by ethics in peacebuilding as reported by 19.5% (N=22) followed by gender perspectives in peacebuilding and early warning (15.0%, N=17) for each, followed by peace negotiations and mediation (13%, N=13), followed by countering violent extremism (8.9%, N=10) and lastly self-defense (2.7%, N=4). The numbers above represent the areas in which the majority of the members of the peacebuilding infrastructure have been trained and are not mutually exclusive. The training of the leadership of the sub-county peacebuilding committee is an important issue as was confirmed by a senior Government respondent when talking about the sub-county peacebuilding committee.

The National Steering Committee which is the body set up to train the sub-county peacebuilding committee has trained some, but not all of them have been trained. The chairs of the DCPs have been trained and they understand the work, and the policies behind the DCPs those that have not been trained, we have been engaging them, me, and my security committee, we usually meet them at their local levels and explain their work (KII interview with Government official, Jomvu, March 9, 2022).

During the focus group discussions, it was determined that the above were not the only topics or areas of training that have been carried out among the members of the peacebuilding infrastructure. Among the young members of the committees, training on entrepreneurship, life skills, dangers of drug abuse, theatre and communications skills, human rights, social accountability, food security, and nutrition have all been part of the peacebuilding agenda in Mombasa County. Certain programs in the county peacebuilding agenda such as the one run by a collaborating partner called "Search for Common Ground" has focused on the capacity of youth to engage in policy dialogue as part of improving the role of youth in peacebuilding.

According to Chitembwe and Odhiambo (2021), a renewed movement to fight for the self-determination of citizens in the coastal region emerged in the counties of Mombasa and Kwale in 2008 when the MRC regained traction, calling for secession from Kenya. Among the 32 classes that were prohibited by the Ministry of Internal Security in the Gazette Notice, 125855 was the MRC hence there was a need for peacebuilding training.

A key question that the study was concerned with was whether the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees had put in place systems that allowed them to work effectively. Three major areas were explored; adequate structures such as office space, recognized officials who run the affairs of the committee, whether these officials were changed regularly through a credible process and whether the Sub-county Peace Committees had a workplan.

Table-2. Whether Local Peace Committees have structures, workplan and office bearers are changed regularly

	Whether Local Peace Committees have structures that facilitate peace work		Whether office bearers are changed regularly through a credible process		Whether Local Peace Committees have a work plan for peace work in Mombasa County	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	5	4.4	11	9.7	13	11.5
Disagree	7	6.2	9	7.8	17	15.0
Undecided	3	2.7	7	6.2	9	7.9
Agree	67	59.3	59	52.2	63	55.8
Strongly Agree	31	27.4	27	23.9	11	9.8
Total	113	100.0	113	100.0	113	100.0

Source: field data, 2021.

On the question of the presence of adequate systems, the majority of the respondents 59.3% (N=67) expressed the view that there were structures in place for effective work, while 27.4% (N=31) strongly agreed. Cumulatively 86.7% of the respondents agreed with the inquiry that there were recognized officials in place to facilitate their work. Cumulatively, only 13% (N=15) felt that there were no structures in place for the effective functioning of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee. Similarly, on the question of whether office bearers were changed regularly through a credible process, the majority of respondents seemed to agree with the proposition. 52.2% (N=59) agreed and 23.9% (N=27) agreed strongly. However, there was a significant number who disagreed with the proposition, as 23.7% (N=27) seemed to think that office-bearers are not changed regularly through a credible process. Government guidelines on the tenure of office as per the *Standard Guidelines and ToR for Peace Structures in Kenya, 2016,* is 3 years, which was supposed to guard against the peace infrastructure being dominated by a few individuals and being caught in the politics of the day.

On the question of the Peacebuilding Committee having and implementing a work plan, the picture changed significantly. Cumulatively, 65.6% (N=74) either agreed or agreed strongly with the proposition that the sub-county peacebuilding committee had a work plan for their work while another cumulative 34.4% (N=39) responded that there was no workplan. The picture that emerges from this analysis is that, while respondents saw their Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee as having recognized office bearers, the issues of management and operations are less clear because as will be seen in the results from the focus group discussions, Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees do not have designated offices and at times, the same people have continued to occupy offices for a long time.

A follow-up question regarding the registration of the Local Peace Committees peaks at how the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee has positioned itself within the larger county peacebuilding agenda. Each sub-county peacebuilding committee functions under the Sub-county commissioner who is the patron, and therefore require no registration. Their funds are controlled through the Provincial Administration mechanism, like other Government departments. However, the Peacebuilding Committees that feel they could source additional funds to carry out their work are required by law to register and most have registration certificates from the Ministry of Public Service, Youth, and Gender Affairs. Through this registration, they can apply for funds from any willing donor, and as a requirement submit annual returns to the Ministry. The study found that, out of 113 respondents, 71.68% (N=81) stated that their committee had been registered and 28.32% (N=32) were of the contrary opinion. This trend points to the issue of resources for Sub-county Peace Committees which will be reviewed in the coming sections.

5.3. Conflict Analysis Undertaken by Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees

The study sought to investigate whether the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure had undertaken conflict analysis and ascertain the causes of conflict in Mombasa County. The results are presented in Table 3.

Table-3. Conflict analysis undertaken by Sub-county Peacebuilding Committee

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	11	9.7	9.7	9.7
Disagree	12	10.6	10.6	20.4
Undecided	5	4.4	4.4	24.8
Agree	51	45.1	45.1	69.9
Strongly Agree	34	30.1	30.1	100.0
Total	113	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data, 2021

Out of 113, 9.7% (N=11) strongly disagreed that conflict analysis has been undertaken in Mombasa County, 10.6% (N=12) disagreed, and 4.4% (N=5) were undecided. However, a cumulative 75% (N=84) agreed that conflict analysis had been undertaken. The significance of this finding is perhaps more in the understanding of the term "conflict analysis" than whether or not the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure had undertaken any conflict analysis. This point is buttressed by the fact that when further asked to state how often conflict occurred in their locality, a majority of 75% (N=85) answered that conflict occurred either daily or weekly in their locality.

6. Summary and Conclusions

This study concludes that Mombasa County Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are experiencing diminished agency because of a lack of resources to carry out peacebuilding work in the County. Given the very visible hand of the Government in the peacebuilding agenda, this study concludes that peacebuilding in Mombasa County is still very much a Government affair with a little input from the locals by way of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. How Government controls the appointment to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, seems to oppose the idea of "local peace by local people".

On interrogating the competency of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, the study concluded that the members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were not competent to undertake modern-day peacebuilding activities because of inadequate training.

NSC is designed for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees that are well-grounded in modern methods of conflict analysis, management, and peacebuilding. The training is neither adequate nor systematic enough to ensure that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have the requisite competence for sustainable peacebuilding.

Recommendations

The study recommends that the idea of peacebuilding through local peacebuilding structures such as Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees be a priority in Kenya's peacebuilding discourse with some modifications in the formation and functioning of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees should be de-linked from the county security processes and positioned as the "Honest Brokers for Peacebuilding", whose primary responsibility will be to harness all available resources in their locality to bear on their peacebuilding agenda. Educate the public about peacebuilding and the role that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are expected to play in this agenda.

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